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From the Bench
So?What is \four Judicial Philosophy?

So?what's your judicial philosophy? I
am asked this question often enough
that sometimes I feel I need a pat answer.

There are so many options: liberal, con?

servative, activist, non-activist, legal
realist, deconstructionist, Holmesian

pragmatist, strict constructionist. The
list is endless. The problem is that these

conventional labels fail to address the

most important issue of all in assessing
a judge: Is he or she fair?

When people try to characterize a
judge, they usually have in mind the

familiar political categories?liberal

and conservative. For a federal judge,
the analysis often does not go much

beyond the political philosophy of the
president who appointed that judge. This
trend toward political pigeonholing has

worsened since the Bork and Thomas

confirmation hearings. Because those
hearings were so ideological, much of
the public has come to believe that
judging must be a political, result-driven
process, in which a pre-existing philos?
ophy often dictates the outcome.

I disagree. It seems to me that the
proper way to evaluate a judge is to

by David M. Ebel

Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

isolate personal ideology from the deci?

sion-making process.
Some may say this is impossible. I
concede that it can never be achieved to

So what is my "judicial philoso?

perfection, but that ought to be the
ideal. It should always be a conscious
objective in deciding cases. A recover?
ing alcoholic makes a conscious deci?
sion each day not to drink?that is, to
isolate personal desire so that it does
not control conduct. It should not be

phy"? It is nothing more complicated
than trying to decide each case with
impartiality, according to established
legal principles where possible, and

using logic and appropriate policies

underlying the relevant law to fill in the

gaps. This approach has two bedrock
principles: (1) a preeminent allegiance
to objectivity and (2) a belief that a

more difficult for a judge to isolate per?

sonal political and social views when
deciding cases. It boils down to a mat?
ter of will?and integrity.

careful application of the pertinent law,

tempered by consideration of such

Let me offer an example. Before

law's raison d'etre, can yield a princi?

pled decision not based on a judge's
personal political views or philosophy.

At the core of this approach is a

joining the bench, I expressed my per?
sonal opposition to the death penalty.

Yet I knew that as a judge I would
review death penalty cases. I also knew

belief that justice should be objective
and evenhanded. Anyone who comes
before a judge should know that the

that I would be required to apply the
law, and not my own views, in deciding

such cases. Death penalty cases thus

case will be evaluated fairly on its own

offered a clear test of my ability to sub?

legal merits?regardless of whether

the party or the conduct under scrutiny

handed, and principled without regard
to what political constituency may ben?
efit or suffer from case outcomes. Jus?

happens to hold a favored position in

tice would be better served if judges

peeks under her blindfold, whether it is
to notice race or other personal charac?

on the basis of political labels.
In discussing the process of deciding

?by a deliberate act of will?seek to

is to simply describe an approach that
seems to work for me.

consider whether he or she is fair, even

were evaluated more on that basis than

bench. But a judge can be aware of his
or her predominant biases and should

ordinate my own views to principled
decision making.
Thus far, I have voted four times on

cases involving the death penalty.

the judge's personal value system. Jus?

tice is compromised whenever she

Three times I voted to uphold the sen?

teristics irrelevant to the case or

cases, I can draw only upon my own
experiences. There doubtless are other
approaches that have been used suc?
cessfully by other judges. My objective

whether it is to track the political and
social view of the judge.

Of course, no judge lives in a vac?
uum. No one can unlearn or disavow a
lifetime of values when elevated to the
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tence. Once I voted to reverse. In each
instance, I tried to let the result be
determined by an analysis of prevailing
legal principles. These were not easy
votes, but I have drawn from them a
conviction that a judge can isolate even
strongly held views in deciding cases in
a principled and objective way.
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In our elected branches of govern?

The parties' legal rights seemed little

into my chambers for the first time.
Perched on the transom above the door

courts' rush to judgment. In the case

leading to my predecessor's office, I
discovered a well-worn penny. Had I
stumbled upon the secret mechanism
by which cases are decided?
I have now been on the bench five

ment?Congress and the executive

more than minor obstacles in the

branch?we want leaders with a political
or social agenda. That is not only accept?
able, but desirable, because the consti?
tutional functions of those branches are

where my client appeared to be the vic?
tim of the judge's bias, I kept remem?

to establish and implement social pol?
icy. We can throw the rascals out of
office periodically if we come to dis?
agree with their agendas or visions.
The courts obviously have a differ?
ent role. Those who look to the judi?
ciary as the primary engine for social
change misperceive both the constitu?
tional structure of our government and

bering the old western movie where a
posse had seized a person suspected of
cattle rustling. The posse assured the
hapless prisoner's wife that he would

years. During that time, I have voted to

resolve more than 2,000 cases on the

get a fair trial before he was hanged.

merits. Many of these cases were diffi?

Scrupulous Impartiality

nearly in equipoise. What is interesting,

Partly because of these two experi?
ences, I decided that if I were ever a
judge, my primary objective would be

cult; the conflicting arguments were
however, is that, although many cases
involved close issues on which reason?

to try to decide cases with scrupulous

able judges could differ, only four or
five left me in significant personal

to resolve actual cases, specific contro?

and in other equally ill-informed con?

doubt about my own vote by the time a
result was finally issued.

ing parties come forward to put their

referred to as a liberal (when I have had
to apply liberal laws) and sometimes as

the fundamental tenets of a democracy.

The unique task reserved for judges is

versies between parties. When oppos?
cases on the scales of justice, the last
thing our government should provide
to them is a biased judge?or one with
a secret (or not so secret) agenda that
may affect the result. Bias should be
unacceptable in any form, whether it is
directed at one of the parties personally,
whether it is directed for or against the
type of claim one of the parties asserts,
or whether it stems from an underlying

social agenda. The parties' arguments

are what should be weighed on the
scales of justice?and not the thumb of

the judge.
As a practicing lawyer, I twice expe?

rienced what it was like to have a case
before a judge who appeared to be pre?

disposed toward a particular result.
They were the two worst experiences
of my professional career. My consola?

tion is the other side of the coin: For

more than twenty years, I litigated
cases in courts throughout this country,
and these were the only two instances
where I felt the judge was not trying to
be objective and impartial.

In one of the cases, the judge's biases

favored my client. We won hands

impartiality. During cocktail chatter

texts, I have heard myself sometimes

a conservative (when I have had to

apply conservative law). Both labels
reveal a lack of understanding of what

I am about. Lawyers who practice

before me seem to know better. Period?

ically, the Almanac of the Federal Judi?

ciary asks lawyers how they would
describe the federal judges before

whom they practice. In the latest edi?

tion, I was described as impartial,

"non-doctrinaire," "unbiased," and "not
ideological." That confirms to me that I
am doing my job.
After impartiality, the second princi?
ple of my "judicial philosophy" is this:

The individual predilection of a judge
can best be contained by paying careful

attention to the process for deciding
cases. When the process of decision is
approached step-by-step, guided by
well-established judicial precepts for
decision making, a result usually can be
reached without consulting the judge's

political or social views.

The question of how cases are

decided?that is, what process yields

the result?has long been an interest of

down. I believe we should have won on

mine. One of my earliest anxieties

the merits anyway, but I could never be
absolutely sure that that was the reason

when I was approached about being a

suspected that the judge had predeter?
mined a result against my client because

arrive at a federal court of appeals have
already been through the district court.
It seemed that most litigants would not

for the decision. In the other case, I

of the judge's own sense of proper
social policy. We settled before the full

damage could be done.

Both experiences were equally

unpleasant. In each, I felt we were

merely engaged in a charade to con?
struct a facade of legitimacy for what

was actually a preordained outcome.

judge was whether it would be hard to
decide cases. I knew that the cases that

carry their dispute to the court of

I have observed that appellate deci?
sion making is like a journey. The judge
starts with the record. Statutory lan?
guage, precedent, constitutional princi?
ples, procedural rules, and rules of con?

struction are sign posts that indicate
where the road leads. Following such
principled guideposts, a judge should
be willing to accept whatever destination
is at the end of the road. If the destina?

tion is unappealing, it is largely up to
the democratically elected branches of

government to change the road. The
primary job of the court is simply to
ensure that the guideposts?the rules?
are followed and that the journey is not

a sham. If a judge becomes too pas?
sionate about the result of a particular
case, it impairs his or her ability to be a
faithful guardian of the process. Over
the past two hundred years, the judicial
process has served us well; if it is com?

promised, we will have lost far more
than we could ever gain through any
ideologically driven set of decisions.
I pick up each new case with antici?

pation because I do not know how it
will be resolved. I often lean one way
and then the other as I consider the
sequence of arguments presented in the
briefs. By the time I arrive at oral argu?
ment (in cases that are actually argued),

I have read the briefs and key prece?
dents; considered the difficult issues
with my law clerks; and tried to see
how the case fits into the matrix of

applicable legal principles. Despite
such preparation, oral argument fre?

appeals unless both sides felt they had

quently makes an impact. Finally, I also
want to hear from my colleagues on the

anced that the cases would be impossi?
ble to decide in any principled way?
My unease heightened when I walked

During this journey, I gradually develop

pretty good arguments. Would the
opposing arguments be so well bal?

Litigation Fall 1993

panel before I settle into a decision.

(Please turn to page 56)
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leave the question entirely up to the

witness.

MITTED TO TESTIFY IN TERMS

Angus wants the rule to say,
DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO
BE REASONABLY RELIED UPON

OF THE ULTIMATE ISSUE UNLESS
IT IS NECESSARY TO A FAIR DIS?
POSITION OF THE CASE.
In criminal cases, the practice is

FIELD.

even more dangerous when an investi?
gator or a police officer says that in his

BY EXPERTS IN THE PARTICULAR
There is another problem, one that

can be even worse. Some courts let the

expert repeat these inadmissible facts
to the jury for the purpose of "explain?

ing the opinion." Sometimes lawyers

even call expert witnesses to the stand
just for the purpose of getting inadmis?

sible evidence before the judge and

jury.

Unfair, says Angus. Change Rule

expert opinion the evidence shows the
defendant is guilty. So Angus wants

Rule 704 to say TESTIMONY IN THE
FORM OF THE ULTIMATE ISSUE IS

NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL
CASE.
? Discovery

The Federal Rules of Evidence?
particularly those that apply to expert

703 so that INADMISSIBLE EVI?
witnesses?are based on the notion that
DENCE WHICH IS PART OF THE
both parties have the opportunity for
BASIS OF AN EXPERT'S OPINION
full discovery before trial.
MAY NOT BE TESTIFIED TO
Rule 705, for example, says that the
UNLESS BROUGHT OUT ON witness doesn't have to give the bases
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE for the opinion before testifying to the
EXPERT OR UNLESS THE FAC? opinion itself?unless the court
TUAL BASIS OF THE OPINION ISrequires it (which never happens).
CHALLENGED BY THE OPPO?
But the rule lets the other side ask
NENT.
? How should the witness testify?
Rule 705 says an expert witness can
give an opinion without "first disclos?
ing the underlying facts or data unless
the court requires otherwise" (and the
court never does).
The purpose of the rule was to get rid

about the bases for the opinion on

cross-examination?which is fine if the
other side took the expert's deposition

before trial. Otherwise it would be a
suicide cross-examination.
The trouble is, there are no deposi?

tions in most criminal cases.

When you think about it, the com?

of the hypothetical question?which
was often confusing, and in actual

mon law rules?that limited expert

practice was a perfect opportunity to let
the expert argue the case in the middle
of the trial.

dence in the case and required the bases

Today we don't need the hypotheti?
cal question to let the expert argue the
case in the middle of the trial. Rule 704
lets the expert testify to the ultimate

issue?unless it relates to the mental

capacity of the defendant in a criminal

case. And Rule 702 says the expert can
testify "in the form of an opinion or
otherwise," which means formal opin?
ions are not required.
When you put the two together, you

opinions to explaining admissible evi?

for the opinion to be revealed before
the opinion itself?gave the defendant
serious protection. It wasn't so neces?
sary to take the expert's deposition
(although it still would have been nice).

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
expert discovery is far more important

than it used to be under the common
law?but we still don't have it.
Angus thinks that's unfair. So he says

Rule 705 should say THE DEFEN?
DANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS

have a paid witness who retells the

A RIGHT TO CONDUCT A VOIR
DIRE EXAMINATION OF ANY

words the jury will hear in the instruc?

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE

car's entire braking system was unrea?

TIFIES, UNLESS THE DEFENDANT

party's whole story, ending with the

tions?such as, "In other words, the

sonably dangerous in both its design
and manufacture."
Angus thinks this whole practice has

gone too far, and the rule should be

changed for civil cases to say

EXPERTS SHOULD NOT BE PER

ADVERSE EXPERT WITNESS,

JURY, BEFORE THE WITNESS TES?

HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SO

EXAMINE THE WITNESS BEFORE
TRIAL.
Angus says, adopt some basic princi?

ples like these, and we'll be ready to
start fine tuning. 10

Litigation Fall 1993

From the

Bench

(Continued from page 4)

a sense of confidence in the correctness

of a particular decision. Somehow, the
process works.
I am not saying that a judge does not

exercise judgment, make choices, or
examine policies underpinning the law.

We do that all the time. Sometimes, a

guidepost is missing. We have to

choose between conflicting legal prin?

ciples; we have to decide whether, and
how, to extend a principle into a new
area; we have to give content to some
of the very broad phrases that appear in
the Constitution and in certain legisla?
tion; and we continually must evaluate
the importance of factual differences
that may distinguish a case from prece?
dent. For these tasks and the many oth?

ers requiring judicial judgment, we
must consult policy: legislative policies
underlying ambiguous statutes, historic
policies underlying the great and gen?

eral clauses in the Constitution, and
even public policies underlying the
common law. But, nowhere in these

exercises of judgment do I see an invi?
tation for a judge to look to his or her
own personal policies and social agenda.

If a judge is prepared to proceed
step-by-step along the journey of deci?

sion, judgments and choices are more
easily confined by legal principles than

would be true if the approach were to
select a preferred result first and then to

work backward, constructing an analy?

sis supporting the result. If a judge
respects the integrity of the decision

making process, the result usually will
take care of itself.

Why am I so concerned about the

process when it is the result that seems

to matter most to the actual litigants

and often to society at large? As a

lawyer, I certainly never had a client
more concerned about the reasoning
than about the result reached in the par?

ticular case. Even landmark decisions

from the United States Supreme Court

are popularly known for their result
rather than their logic.
The answer is that the process is crit?

ically important. It can significantly
determine the result. Focusing on the
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process does not disregard result; it

judicial branch is to decide cases in an

he made "little impact," and that there

simply directs attention upstream. No

objective and principled way, and that
the other branches of government pri?

was "no consistent thread to his opin?
ions." Jeff Rosen, writing in the New

agenda for the country. Time and again,
I watched him travel the kind of road

having "intelligence without vision."

starting with the record, applying the
time-honored precepts of interpretation

Nor is it my purpose to argue that Jus?
tice White (or, indeed, any other Jus?
tice) is free from some legitimate criti?
cism over the course of a long career.

result can be considered fair if it was

not reached in a principled manner.

Moreover, only through principled
decision making can courts achieve
consistency in the results reached by a

diverse group of judges. Such consis?
tency and predictability are important

for people to manage their lives and
business affairs, and consistency is
greatly enhanced when results flow
from established principles and pro?
cesses rather than from the whims or
ideology of individual judges.

There also is this: Principled deci?

sion making is essential to the preser?
vation of the authority of the courts.

Judges' decisions are accepted because
of the institutional premise that judges
apply the law, rather than making it. If
the courts become just another political
branch, it will be hard to explain why

marily set the political and social

Republic, accused Justice White of
It is not my purpose here to rebut

toward decision I have described? these evaluations on a detailed basis.

and decision making, and accepting
whatever result followed. More than
once, I suspect, he might have voted
differently if the issue had been pre?
sented to him as a legislator.
During that year, I never saw Justice
White skew or distort a fact, or give an
intellectually clever but fanciful and
strained interpretation of the law, sim?
ply to reach a particular result. I never,
ever, heard him even hint of the possi?

bility that the analysis might follow,

However?to say that Justice White
left no judicial legacy or that he was not

generally consistent or that he lacked

vision is just plain nonsense. Those

who want to present the judicial
process in a political light will be frus?
trated in trying to catalogue the results
of Justice White's cases into a coherent

political scheme. But the processes by

which Justice White decided those
cases were coherent and can be placed
into a consistent legal scheme.
As a former law clerk and long-time
follower of his opinions, I think that the

the executive or legislative branches
should defer to our judgments. They,

after all, have a much better claim to

overarching legacy Justice White has

the role of policymakers than do we.
There also is a pragmatic reason why

pled decision making. Results were

left for his country is a vision of princi?

judges should focus on the process

important, but the Justice was also a

strong believer in preserving the

rather than the result. Judges are well

equipped to decide individual cases;
our training suits us to conduct legal
reasoning and analysis. However, we
are ill equipped to evaluate broader
societal consequences. Regardless of

integrity of the judicial process. One
can draw from his opinions the mes?
sage, indeed the admonition, that if jus?
tice is merely a surrogate for the politi?

cal process, if reasoning is really only

litigants' rhetoric, we need to remem?

rationalization, and if fairness to indi?

ber that what they are really arguing
about are only their own individual

vidual litigants can be sacrificed for the

perceived national good, then justice

interests. We lack the staff and the data

gathering mechanisms that the other
branches of government have. We thus
are handicapped in evaluating the polit?

euphemistically clothed as "vision" or
"judicial philosophy."
Several months ago, Justice White

observed him, accurately described the
process that led to the result. I suspect

delivered a eulogy for Judge Alfred A.
Arraj, who was an outstanding federal
judge in the District of Colorado. In his
public comments, Justice White suc?
cinctly summarized, I think, his vision
about the judiciary. He said, "If there is

opinions, at least during the year I

ical or economic impact of our deci?

sions on society at large. It is futile to
be preoccupied with the societal impacts

that Justice White had an inherent

of our decisions, because we cannot

gauge them with any real accuracy.

The issue of judicial philosophy and

the attendant debate about the proper
role of judges in charting the political

and social course of our country have
been in the news recently as Court
watchers, historians, and journalists
have struggled to evaluate our most
recently retired Supreme Court Jus?
tice?Byron R. White.
I had the privilege of clerking for
Justice White during the 1965-66 Term
of Court. He was, during that year, the

epitome of a judge practicing princi?
pled decision making. He had a clear

vision: He believed that the role of the

isn't justice at all. It becomes a charade,

rather than precede, the decision. The
reasoning set forth in Justice White's

understanding of the risk that philoso?
phy could turn into ideology and that
ideology is the natural enemy of objec?
tivity and fairness. At the core, he was
pragmatic. He had little difficulty limit?
ing a line of cases when they began to
diverge from reality or when they led
the Court into an area that he did not
perceive as properly judicial in nature.
I simply disagree with several recent
writers in the national press that, in my
opinion, misunderstand Justice White's
approach to his office as a Justice of the

United States Supreme Court. Profes?
sor Alan Dershowitz wrote a syndi?

one thing important to the judicial sys?
tem, it's the notion that you are going to

get a square deal with that judge." A

square deal means that the case will be
decided objectively and with integrity,
on its own merits and not for political

reasons. That, said Justice White, is

exactly what "the framers had in mind
when they created a federal judiciary."

There you have it?a vision and a judi?

cated article that concluded that Justice

White "leaves no judicial legacy," that

Litigation Fall 1993

cial philosophy. It cannot be called con?

servative, or liberal, or activist, or

deconstructionist, or any of the other
labels that journalists and scholars like
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to use. It can only be called "fair" and

testimony in half. But this time savings
must be weighed against a possible loss

"principled." To my way of thinking,
that's a pretty good judicial philosophy.
A postscript: I watched with interest
the confirmation proceedings of Justice

of persuasive force: Narrative testi?
mony may bore the jury more quickly
than the give-and-take of the traditional

question-and-answer format. This is
especially true if the witness is not a

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who now occu?
pies the seat on the Supreme Court that
Justice White held for 31 years. When
she was nominated, she referred to cer?

good narrator. Furthermore, the empha?
sis on particular points added by attor?
ney questions is lost in a narrative.
In the end, the best way to present a
witness's testimony efficiently is to fol?

tain views of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that
she said were consistent with her own.
To Chief Justice Rehnquist she attrib?

uted the guidance that "[a] judge is
bound to decide each case fairly in a
court with the relevant facts and the
applicable law even when the decision

or made objections. Next, the parties

met and tried to resolve disputes.

Finally, the parties met with a special
master in several marathon pre-trial
sessions to resolve the remaining evi?

dentiary problems. All these steps
should take place at least a week before

the trial starts; that gives the parties
time to focus their cases on the evi?
dence that will actually be used.

Such a pretrial process can be time
consuming, both for the parties and for
the judge or referee who helps resolve
disputes. But it is not much different
from the extensive pretrial procedures
now used by courts around the country.
With the documentary evidence in place

and all objections resolved before the

is not [as he put it], what the home town

wants." In speaking of Justice Oliver

trial begins, the abridged trial can pro?

Wendell Holmes, she drew from a

ceed quickly and smoothly. If, despite
these efforts, an evidentiary dispute

paper published by New York Univer?
sity Law Professor Burt Neuborne,

who summarized Justice Holmes's

arises during the trial itself, the parties
should defer the issue until the end of

judicial philosophy as follows:
When a modern constitutional

the day and then seek the assistance of
the judge or referee.

Such evidentiary disputes are most

judge is confronted with a hard
case, Holmes is at her side with

likely to occur during live testimony,

because it cannot be reviewed in

three gentle reminders: first, intel?

low rigorously the basic principles of
advocacy: focus on the big points and
eliminate interesting-but-secondary
issues. As with any trial, persuasive

lectual honesty about the available

policy choices; second, disci?

plined self-restraint in respecting

the majority's policy choices; and
third, principled commitment to
defense of individual autonomy

force can be boosted by presenting

information in visual or graphic form.
The parties used charts to simplify and

even in the face of majority action.

summarize information that would

To those remarks, she added only an
"amen." These references suggest that

have taken hours to elicit on direct. All

such exhibits were exchanged and
questions about their accuracy or

Judge Ginsburg too is committed to

principled decision making. And to that

admissibility resolved prior to trial.

I add my own "amen." Q

The parties in an abridged private
trial also should use stipulations. Even

Private Jury

Trial

(Continued from page 46)
involvement with the case. Experts pre?
sented what were essentially lectures on
their findings, with little involvement
from attorneys. Cross-examination, of

course, followed the traditional ques

mony undoubtedly will be heard by the
jurors. The narrative testimony form,
particularly when used by an unsophis?

ticated witness (or perhaps a highly
sophisticated one), can lead to slips of

hearsay or argument.

The most egregious example of this

in our case was a highly emotional

plaintiff who went on a tirade about

how the corporate defendant should be
taught a lesson. Without a judge, there

in the most contentious case, the parties

was no one to object to, and no one to
look sternly over the bench at the wit?
ness (and his lawyer). Still, the parties
can agree to make a good faith effort to

And sometimes they can agree to

police testimony to prevent this from

broader stipulations about the facts and

happening. Besides, it is likely that the
jurors will recognize when a witness is

circumstances. The point is simple; in
this kind of condensed proceeding, the
parties should avoid wasting time prov?
ing facts that are not really in dispute.
As an additional way to avoid wasting
time, all objections to written and doc?

umentary evidence were resolved in
advance. The parties set a strict dead?

time limit per witness was imposed.
We found that presenting some or all

form could cut the time for a witness's

Opposing counsel reviewed this materiel
and either submitted counter-evidence

of the direct testimony in narrative

the turn of a phrase. Without a judge
present, some inadmissible live testi?

can usually agree on many basic facts
about background, identification of
parties, and the nature of the claims.

line for this. We first exchanged all doc?
umentary evidence, including exhibits,
written witness summaries, affidavits,
charts, and other demonstrative exhibits.

tion-and-answer format, and an overall

advance, and may depend on nuance or

Litigation Fall 1993

taking advantage of the process and

judge him accordingly. They know spe?
cial pleading when they hear it.

While all of the methods described

can help the parties present much evi?
dence in little time, the best discipline

is that imposed by the time clock. A
party's clock was running?its limited
ration of minutes ebbing away?when?

ever its lawyers examined their own

witnesses, cross-examined opposing

witnesses, or read from documents.
Both parties had to adhere to the rigid
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How Do JUDGES THINK?
JUDGE HARRIS

L

HARTZ

t

This Essay is a sequel, or perhaps a concurrence, to one by my former colleague Robert Henry with the much more clever title, "Do Judges
Think?"' That essay was responding to studies by social scientists purporting to show that a judge's decisions could be predicted by demographic data such as age, gender, religion, party affiliation, and law
school.
The judges with whom I associate do not believe those studies. The
studies are hard to reconcile with the day-to-day experience of changing
our minds about how to decide a case. We read a persuasive appellee's
brief after being convinced of the need for reversal by the appellant's
brief; we read some more case law, a treatise, or even a persuasive law
review article (occasionally); and we actually listen to our colleagues.
The image of the judge conveyed by such studies is of a willful,
power-seeking person intent on imposing on society the judge's personal
view of good policy. My image of my colleagues during my tenure on
both a state and a federal intermediate appellate court is quite different.
The work of an intermediate appellate judge is a fascinating, challenging
task far removed from any sense of power. It would be remarkable if that
were not so. After all, what judge is as impotent as an intermediate appellate judge? We cannot find facts, and we are not the last word on the
law. Attorneys understand this. One judge I know was nominated for a
newly available position on an intermediate appellate court while his
trial-court nomination was pending; he told me that the lawyers in his
hometown who had been trying to ingratiate themselves after the announcement of the trial-court nomination suddenly lost interest after he
was nominated for the appellate court.
I suspect that most intermediate appellate judges enjoy the work
primarily because it provides a marvelous opportunity to tackle puzzles
and tell stories. I am indebted for this observation to two acquaintances.
One is my son Andrew. Not long after I had been appointed to the state
court, Andrew, a six-year-old who perhaps had been watching too many
detective shows, greeted me on my arrival home by asking, "Did you
solve any cases today?" Over the years, the more I have thought about
his question, the more I think it captures the essence of my work.

f

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

I. Robert Henry, Do Judges Think? Comments on Several Papers Presentedat the Duke
Law Journal'sConference on MeasuringJudges andJustice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2009).
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The other contributor is Ninth Circuit Judge Susan Graber, who has
been one of my favorite people ever since we studied together for the
New Mexico bar exam. She once told me that her ambition had been to
be a novelist, but coming up with plots was too difficult. "Now I have the
perfect job," she told me. "All I have to do is write the last chapter."
Perhaps nonjudicial readers are skeptical. The judges they have met
have strong personalities; they are not shrinking violets who try to avoid
the exercise of power. Repeated judicial expressions of "Moi?" will never convince such a reader of my description of judges. So in this Essay I
will take a different tack. I will not expound on the superiority of judges
as people; only a few of us believe that anyway. I will simply point out
that some of the traditions-well-known but little-discussed-that govern how judges go about their work make it much less likely that they
will engage in the "policy" maneuvers that characterize what are known
as the political branches: the legislature and the executive.
I am not going to try to tell you that judges do not make law. Whenever a court resolves an issue that was up in the air, it makes law. But
process is important. And the process by which judges make law is quite
unlike how the political branches make law. Judicial decision-making
has many components. I will focus on only two: the traditions of consistency and neutral principles.
In the political branches, consistency may be considered a virtue,
but it is a minor virtue. What is most important to constituents is that a
political figure have the "correct" position now. Perhaps they can have
more confidence in a candidate who has taken that "correct" position for
a long time, but they view a recent switch to that position as a sign of
gaining wisdom more than as a failure to play by the rules. A perfect
consistency is less likely to be praised than to be condemned as displaying inflexibility and a failure to perceive the new realities.
In particular, consistency in process is not highly valued in the
rough-and-tumble of politics. Whether a position is considered correct is
almost always solely a function of the ultimate result, not the propriety of
the procedure by which it was reached. The public is generally most interested in whose ox is being gored, not what weapon is employed in the
goring. Failure to vigorously enforce the law is reprehensible when the
failure is by a member of the opposing party but understandable, even
laudable, when it is the failure of a member of one's own. Failure to obey
procedural niceties is always worse when the failure is by one's political
opponents. Consider Senate filibusters. Some would say that a senator's
attitude depends largely upon whether the senator's party is in the majority in that body.
I am not saying that the political branches are bad. Results matter.
Even highly intelligent, well-informed people are "result oriented."
When was the last time you read a newspaper editorial condemning the
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result of a judicial opinion but saying that the judges' decision was correct on the law? (I actually recall reading one in the Albuquerque Journal, whose editor is a law-school graduate.)
Judges certainly are born with the same instincts. But they perform
in a system that frowns on being result-oriented. By tradition, a judge is
expected to be consistent. (Note, by the way, that I am distinguishing
between a judge and a court. It is more common for a court to be inconsistent than for a judge to be. The court, of course, can change direction
as a result of a change in membership, with no individual member having
changed his or her mind.)
Look at the ways in which the system encourages judicial consistency. First, the judiciary has a great institutional memory. Judicial
decisions are published, and readily accessible, if not widely read. If a
judge is inconsistent, the judge has no place to hide. When a judge's rulings on whether a party has standing to sue depends on the judge's sympathy with the party's cause, the world knows. This is less a feature of
life for trial judges. I recall one judge who would, for example, overrule
an objection to a question posed to a character witness but later in the
same trial sustain an objection to the same question posed to a different
character witness. We joked that the judge wanted to make sure that he
got it right at least once. The judge's inconsistency was buried, though,
because few would order a trial transcript and read it. In contrast, it is
hard for appellate judges to cover their tracks.
Strengthening this constraint on the exercise of judicial power is the
tradition that appellate judges write opinions explaining their decisions.
An inconsistent member of the political branches may never be questioned about an inconsistency or, when questioned, may well be able to
evade the question, as by changing the subject-instead of explaining her
view on filibusters, the Senator may argue the merits of the proposed
legislation being filibustered. Judges do not have that luxury. Readers
can search the opinions for inconsistencies. And usually such a search is
unnecessary. Tradition instructs that an opinion must not only provide
the rationale for the result but must also summarize the losing parties'
arguments (often at the outset of the discussion), which are likely to rely
on any prior decision that appears inconsistent with the opinion. Most
people, and that includes judges, care sufficiently about their reputations
that they will accept an unpleasant result rather than expose themselves
as irrational. We all recognize that any judge of sufficiently long tenure
will have said things that others will find irrationally inconsistent; but I
submit that the frequency of such irrational inconsistencies is much lower than it would be in the absence of the tradition of written explanatory
opinions.
It is easy to overlook the importance of the role of consistency in
judicial decision-making. But its application is ubiquitous. Some applications may seem mundane. In deciding whether a party has adequately
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preserved an argument for appeal, we need to compare the case to others
where we have found or not found preservation. Some are more profound: When is a dispute about official conduct a political question, one
beyond the competence of courts to decide? Judges should not examine
only the conduct of officials with whom they disagree.
Because of the mandate of consistency, the motives that led to creation of a doctrine are irrelevant when it comes time to apply it. One of
my favorite examples is the creation of the legal fiction that a suit for
injunctive relief against unconstitutional action by a state official is not a
suit against the state itself because if the official was acting unconstitutionally, he or she was not acting for the state. 2 The doctrine is often invoked on behalf of the less fortunate in society. It was enunciated by the
Supreme Court, however, to permit a railroad to challenge state regulations.3
The mandate of consistency is the source of one of the great challenges in writing opinions. Judges need to speak in terms of general principles, so their decisions do not appear ad hoc. But they do not want to
speak with such generality that their words will come back to haunt them
when a case arises with a different twist. A judge must balance the need
to give principled guidance against the risk of stating a rule so broadly
that a future case will compel the judge to write something inconsistent
with that rule. One might think that the more experienced the judge, the
more comfortable the judge will be in writing broadly. After all, over the
course of years the judge will gain expertise in a particular subject matter
and can write broadly with confidence. Sometimes that is true. At least
equally often, however, experience teaches the judge that it is impossible
for the human mind to anticipate all the variety of life and that judges
should write with some modesty.
I learned that lesson early in my career. When I joined the New
Mexico Court of Appeals, the court had to deal with three significantly
different workers' compensation statutes. The old law had been "reformed," and the reform had been significantly revised shortly thereafter.
A recurring question was which law applied. I was assigned a case raising the question and resolved to settle the matter once and for all. I read
every relevant published opinion in the state and decided that the courts
had always applied the law in effect on the date that the worker's cause
of action accrued. I circulated an opinion saying so. One of the members
of the panel was the senior judge on the court. He insisted that I preface
2. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) ("If the act which the state attorney
general seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under
such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.").
3. See generally Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex parte Young: Once Controversial, Now
Canon, in FEDERAL COURT STORIES 247 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
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this statement of the general rule with the language, "in the absence
of ...compelling reasons to the contrary."4 I remember thinking what a
wimp he was, unwilling to take a firm stand. Although I included in the
opinion the reasoning that persuaded me of the correctness of the general
rule, I caved and included the escape-hatch language. 5 Lucky for me.
Less than two years later I proudly wrote that "compelling reasons" required applying a statute whose effective date was after the worker's
cause of action accrued. 6 The senior judge was also on the latter panel,
but he was too much of a gentleman to say, "I told you so."
Now to the second constraint on judicial decision-making-the tradition that judges should apply neutral principles. Yes, as conceded
above, judges make law. I know of no other way to describe a judicial
decision that resolves a previously undecided legal question. But judges
are less willful about it than those in the political branches of government. They invest less ego, or at least less policy-making ego.
The reasons for this are subtle. Every judge I have known is quite
aware that he or she was not elected or appointed to decide the specific
case at issue in a particular way. Maybe those who put the judge in office
expected a favorable response on a few issues, but most matters a judge
ends up deciding were simply not on the radar screen at the outset of the
judge's term. As a result, most judges wonder from time to time what
gives them the authority, the power, to determine what the law should be
in a particular case. Why should my particular policy preferences be "the
law" when there is no reason to believe that the public at large or the
people to whom I "owe" my office share those preferences?
To avoid these self-doubts about legitimacy, judges look for neutral
principles. I use this term to refer to methods of resolving cases-under
the common law, statutes, or the Constitution-that do not require the
judge to examine his or her personal preferences about what the best
result would be. To some, maybe many or even most, the enterprise of
finding such neutral principles may seem doomed to failure. But there
has actually been great progress in recent decades.
Take the brilliant little book by Professor Melvin Eisenberg, The
Nature of the Common Law.7 This is not the place, and there is insufficient space, to summarize what the book expounds. I know of no judge,
however, who has read the book and does not think that it provides the
proper methodology for judges to do their common-law work without
relying on their personal social-policy preferences. This is not to say that
the book makes common law adjudication a mechanical process of applying algorithms. I recall vigorously dissenting from an opinion of a
4.
5.
6.

Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cas., 782 P.2d 395, 397 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
Id.
See Lucero v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 818 P.2d 863, 866 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

7.

MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
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colleague of mine on the state court who shared my enthusiasm for the
Eisenberg book. But at least we had a common framework to start from.
We could debate the issue without resorting to the fallback position of,
8
because "that's the way, uh-huh uh-huh, I like it."
And much of the best work on statutory interpretation has been
written since I became a judge. I would not say that there is a consensus
on how to construe statutes. But there have certainly been developments
that have achieved near-unanimous support. For example, there is much
greater care in the use of legislative history, particularly floor debates.
And I am optimistic that the recent book by Justice Antonin Scalia and
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretationof Legal Texts, 9 will
lead to more intelligent use of canons of interpretation (I wish the book
had been available twenty years ago).
The ongoing debate on the gamut of interpretative issues-from the
proper use, if any, of the absurdity doctrine to discerning the purpose of a
statute and the propriety of assuming that the purpose has no bounds (is a
statute an arrow or a vector? 0 )-is all about developing neutral principles, that is, deciding how to read a statute without just saying, "I would
like it to mean thus and so." We are improving what I would call the
common law of statutory interpretation. Scholars and judges produce
new insights that gradually gain traction and eventually are widely recognized as the best interpretative approach. Again, neutral principles will
not eliminate the need for discernment and judgment. But they provide
judges with a framework for adjudication that bears little resemblance to
decision-making within the political branches. No executive or legislator
wastes time asking, "Who am I to decide what the law should be?"
Alas, what about constitutional interpretation? There are deep divisions in that area, and cynics (perhaps rightly so, although I dissent on
this point) view our highest court as acting pretty much like a political
branch. To a large extent, however, differences on the Supreme Court
reflect differences on what neutral principles to apply, such as the level
of generality with which to read constitutional provisions. Perhaps Justices select their neutral principles with a view to particular results. But
once those principles have been selected, the Justice is stuck with them.
The principles will regularly, and in important ways (though perhaps not
often), demand results from which the Justice would personally recoil.
My purpose here has not been to belittle judges. To say that they do
not exercise the sort of raw power exercised by the political branches is
not to say that their work is inconsequential. On the contrary. What jus8.
KC AND THE SUNSHINE BAND, THAT'S THE WAY (ILIKE IT) (TK Records 1975).
9.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012).
10.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994).
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tice would there be in a society whose members could not resort to the
resolution of disputes by a tribunal that must apply neutral principles in a
consistent manner? Judges take considerable pride in their work. It's just
that they do not see their important work as being of the same nature as
the important work of the other branches of government.
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AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON THE 21 ST CENTURY JUDICIARY
PRINCIPLES AND CONCLUSIONS
AUGUST2003

I.

ENDURING PRINCIPLES

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
II.

Judges should uphold the law.
Judges should be independent.
Judges should be impartial.
Judges should possess the appropriate temperament and character.
Judges should possess the appropriate capabilities and credentials.
Judges and the Judiciary should have the confidence of the public.
The judicial system should be diverse and reflective of the society it serves.
Judges should be constrained to perfonn their duties in a manner that justifies
public faith and confidence in the courts.

PRESERVING THE JUDICIARY'S INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY

A. Judicial Qualifications, Training and Evaluation

•
•

•
•
•

States should establish credible, neutral, non-partisan and diverse deliberative
bodies to assess the qualifications of all judicial aspirants so as to limit the
candidate pool to those who are well qualified.
The judicial branch should take primary ~ponsibility for providing continuing
judicial education, that continuing judicial education should be required for all
judges, and that state appropriations should be sufficient to provide adequate
funding for continuing judicial education programs.
Congress should fully fund the State Justice Institute.
States should fully fund the National Center for State Courts.
States should develop judicial evaluation programs to assess the performance of
all sitting judges.

B. ·Judicial Ethics and Discipline

•
•

The American Bar Association should undertake a comprehensive review of the
Model Co<Je of Judicial Conduct.
The codes ofjudicial conduct should be actively enforced.

C. Diversification of the Justice System

•

Members of the legal profession should expand their use of training and
recruitment programs to encourage lawyers who reflect diversity to join their
firms, they should include them fully in firm life, and they should prepare them
for pursuing careers on the bench following their years in practice.
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•
•
•
•
•

Courts should promote a representative work force and diverse court
appointments.
Courts should act aggressively to ensure that language barriers do not limit access
to the justice system.
Courts should have in place formal policies and processes for handling allegations
of bias.
Information regarding diversity should be shared among the courts in a state and
among the states.
Measures should be adopted to improve and expand jury pool representation.

D. Improving Court-Community Relationships

•
•
•

III.

Courts should take steps to promote public understanding of and confidence in the
courts among jurors, witnesses and litigants.
Courts should engage and collaborate with the communities of which they are a
part, by hosting trips to courthouses and by judges and court administrators
speaking in schools and other community settings.
The continuation of problem-solving courts as a means to promote public
confidence in the courts.

IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION

A. The preferred system of state court judicial selection is a commission-based
appointive system, with the following components:

•
•
•

The governor should appoint judges from a pool ofjudicial aspirants ~hose
qualifications have been-reviewed and approved by a credible, neutral, nonP ~ diverse deliberative body or commission.
Judicial appointees should serve until a specified age. Judges so appointed should
not be subject to reselection processes, and should be entitled to retirement
benefits upon completion ofjudicial service.
Judges should not otherwise be subject to reselection, nonetheless remain subject
to regular judicial performance evaluations and disciplinary processes that include
removal for misconduct.

B. Alternative Recommendations on Systems of Judicial Selection

•

For states that cannot abandon the judicial reselection process altogether, judges
should be subject to reappointment by a credible, neutral, non-partisan, diverse
deliberative body.
• For states that cannot abandon judicial elections altogether, elections should be
employed only at the point of initial selection.
• For states that retainjudicial elections as a means ofreselection,judges should
stand for retention election, rather than run in contested elections.
• For states that retain contested judicial elections as a means to select or reselect
judges, all such elections should be non-partisan and conducted in a non-partisan
manner.
..+-

Page 18 of 93

V

•

For states that continue to employ judicial elections as a means of judicial
reselection, judicial terms should be as long as possible.
• For states that use elections to select or reselect judges, states should provide the
electorate with voter guides on the candidate(s).
• For states that use elections to select or reselect judges, state bars or other
appropriate entities should initiate a dialogue among affected interests, in an
effort to deescalate the contributions anns race in judicial campaigns.
• For states that use elections to select or reselect judges, state bars or other
appropriate entities should reach out to candidates and affected interests, in an
effort to establish voluntary guidelines on judicial campaign conduct.
• For states that do not abandon contested elections at the point of initial selection
or reselection, states should create systems of public financing for appellate court
elections.
• For states that retain contested judicial elections and do not adopt systems of
public financing, states should impose limits on contributions to judicial
candidates.
IV.

PROMOTING AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL BRANCH THAT WORKS EFFECTIVELY
WITH THE POLITICAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

•
•
•
•

Standards for minimum funding of judicial systems should be established.
The judiciary's budget should be segregated from that of the political
branches, and it should be presented to the legislature for approval with a
minimwn of non-transferable line itemization.
States should create independent commissions to establish judicial salaries.
States should create opportunities for regular meetings among representatives
from all three branches of government to promote inter-branch
communication as a means to avoid unnecessary confrontations on such issues ·
as court funding, judicial salaries, and structural refonn of courts.
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REMARKS ON THE THEORY OF APPELLATE DECISION AND
THE RULES OR CANONS ABOUT HOW STATUTES
ARE TO BE CONSTRUED
KARL N. LLEWELLYN

*

One does not progress far into legal life without learning that there is
no single right and accurate way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch
of cases. For
(1) Impeccable and correct doctrine makes clear that a case "holds"
with authority only so much of what the opinion says as is absolutely necessary to sustain the judgment. Anything else is unnecessary and "distinguishable" and noncontrolling for the future. Indeed, if the judgment rests on two,
three or four rulings, any of them can be rightly and righteously knocked out,
for the future, as being thus "unnecessary." Moreover, any distinction on the
facts is rightly and righteously a reason for distinguishing and therefore disregarding the prior alleged holding. But
(2) Doctrine equally impeccable and correct makes clear that a case
"holds" with authority the rule on which the court there chose to rest the
judgment; more, that that rule covers, with full authority, cases which are
plainly distinguishable on their facts and their issue, whenever the reason for
the rule extends to cover them. Indeed, it is unnecessary for a rule or principle to have led to the decision in the prior case, or even to have been
phrased therein, in order to be seen as controlling in the new case: (a) "We
there said.. ." (b) "That case necessarily decided..."
These divergent and indeed conflicting correct ways of handling or
reading a single prior case as one "determines" what it authoritatively holds,
have their counterparts in regard to the authority of a series or body of
cases. Thus
(1) It is correct to see that "That rule is too well settled in this
jurisdiction to be disturbed"; and so to apply it to a wholly novel circumstance. But
(2) It is no less correct to see that "The rule has never been extended
to a case like the present"; and so to refuse to apply it: "We here limit the
rule." Again,
(3) It is no less correct to look over the prior "applications" of "the
rule" and rework them into a wholly new formulation of "the true rule" or
* Betts Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law; author,

numerous books and law review articles; draftsman, various uniform commercial acts;
chief reporter, Uniform Commercial Code. The "Thrust and Parry" is in good part the

work of Charles Driscoll.
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"true principle" which knocks out some of the prior cases as simply ",nisapplications" and then builds up the others.
In the work of a single opinion-day I have observed 26 different, describable ways in which one of our best state courts handled its own prior
cases, repeatedly using three to six different ways within a single opinion.
What is important is that all 26 ways (plus a dozen others which happened not to be in use that day) are correct. They represent not "evasion,"
but sound use, application and development of precedent. They represent not
"departure from," but sound continuation of, our system of precedent as it has
come down to us. The major defect in that system is a mistaken idea which
many lawyers have about it-to wit, the idea that the cases themselves and
in themselves, plus the correct rules on how to handle cases, provide one
single correct answer to a disputed issue of law. In fact the available correct
answers are two, three, or ten. The question is: Which of the available correct answers will the court select-and why? For since there is always more
than one available correct answer, the court always has to select.
True, the selection is frequently almost automatic. The type of distinction or expansion which is always technically available may be psychologically or sociologically unavailable. This may be because of (a) the
current tradition of the court or because of (b) the current temper of the
court or because of (c) the sense of the situation as the court sees that sense.
(There are other possible reasons a-plenty, but these three are the most
frequent and commonly the most weighty.)
The current tradition of the court is a matter of period-style in the
craft.of judging. In 1820-1850 our courts felt in general a freedom and duty
to move in the manner typified in our thought by Mansfield and Marshall.
"Precedent" guided, but "principle" controlled; and nothing was good
"Principle" which did not look like wisdom-in-result for the welfare of All-ofus. In 1880-1910. on the other hand, our courts felt in general a prime duty to
order within the law and a duty to resist any "outside" influence. "Precedent"
was to control, not merely to guide; "Principle" was to be tested by whether
it made for order in the law, not by whether it made wisdom-in-result. "Legal"
Principle could not be subjectedto "political" tests; even legislation was resisted as disturbing. Since 1920 the earlier style (the "Grand Style") has been
working its way back into general use by our courts, though the language of the
opinions moves still dominantly (though waningly) in the style (the "Formal
Style") of the late 19th Century. In any particular court what needs study is
how far along the process has gotten. The best material for study is the latest
volume of reports, read in sequence from page 1 through to the end: the current mine-run of the work.
The current temper of the court is reflected in the same material, and
represents the court's tradition as modified by its personnel. For it is plain
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that the two earlier period-styles represent also two eternal types of human
being. There is the man who loves creativeness, who can without loss of
sleep combine risk-taking with responsibility, who sees and feels institutions
as things built and to be built to serve functions, and who sees the functions as
vital and law as a tool to be eternally reoriented to justice and to general
welfare. There is the other man who loves order, who finds risk uncomfortable
and has seen so much irresponsible or unwise innovation that responsibility
to him means caution, who sees and feels institutions as the tested, slow-built
ways which for all their faults are man's sole safeguard against relapse into
barbarism, and who regards reorientation of the law in our polity as essentially
committed to the legislature. Commonly a man of such temper has also a
craftsman's pride in clean craftsman's work, and commonly he does not view
with too much sympathy any ill-done legislative job of attempted reorientation.' Judges, like ther men, range up and down the scale between the extremes of either type of temper, and in this aspect (as in the aspect of
intellectual power and acumen or of personal force or persuasiveness) the
constellation of the personnel on a particular bench at a particular time plays
its important part in urging the court toward a more literal or a more creative
selection among the available accepted and correct "ways" of handling
precedent.
More vital, if possible, than either of the above is the sense of the
situation as seen by the court. Thus in the very heyday of the formal period
our courts moved into tremendous creative expansion of precedent in regard
to the labor injunction and the due process clause. What they saw as sense
to be achieved, and desperately needed, there broke through all trammels of the
current period-style. Whereas the most creative-minded court working in the
most creative period-style will happily and literally apply a formula without
discussion, and even with relief, if the formula makes sense and yields justice
in the situation and the case.
So strongly does the felt sense of the situation and the case affect the
court's choice of techniques for reading or interpreting and then applying the
authorities that one may fairly lay down certain generalizations:
A. In some six appealed cases out of ten the court feels this sense so
clearly that lining up the authorities comes close to being an automatic job.
In the very process of reading an authority a distinction leaps to the eye,
and that is "all" that that case holds; or the language of another authority
(whether or not "really" in point) shines forth as "clearly stating the true
rule." Trouble comes when the cases do not line up this clearly and semi1. Intellectually, this last attitude is at odds with the idea that reorientation is for
the legislature. Emotionally, it is not. Apart from the rather general resistance to change
which normally companions orderliness of mind, there is a legitimate feeling that within
a team team-play is called for, that it is passing the buck to thrust onto a court the labor
of making a legislative job make sense and become workable.
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automatically, when they therefore call for intellectual labor, even at times
for a conclusion that the law as given will not allow the sensible result to
'be reached. Or trouble comes when the sense of the *ituation is not clear.
B. Technical leeways correctly available when the sense of the situation
and the case call for their use cease to be correctly available unless used in
Jurtheranceof what the court sees as such sense. There is here in our system
,of precedent an element of uprightness, or conscience, of judicial respon-sibility; and motive becomes a factor in determining what techniques are
-correct and right. Today, in contrast with 1890, it may be fairly stated that
,even the literal application of a thoroughly established rule is not correct in
a case or situation in which that application does not make sense unless the
,court in honest conscience feels forced by its office to make the application.
C. Collateral to B, but deserving of separate statement, is the proposition
ithat the greater the felt need, because of felt sense, the %wider
is the leeway
,correctly and properly available in reshaping an authority or the authorities.
What is both proper and to be expected in an extreme case would become
;abuse and judicial usurpation if made daily practice in the mine-run of cases.
All courts worthy of their office feel this in their bones, as being inherent in
four system of precedent. They show the feeling in their work. Where differfences appear is where they should appear: in divergent sizings up of what is
sense, and of how great the need may be in any situation.
One last thing remains to be said about "sense."
There is a sense of the type of situation to be contrasted with the sense
,of a particular controversy between particular litigants. Which of these aspects of sense a court responds to more strongly makes a tremendous differ,ence. Response primarily to the sense of the particular controversy is, in the
first place, dangerous because a particular controversy may not be typical, and
'because it is hard to disentangle general sense from personalities and from
"fireside" equities. Such response is dangerous in the second place because it
leads readily to finding an out for this case only-and that leads to a complicating multiplicity of refinement and distinction, as also to repeated resort
to analogies unthought through and unfortunate of extension. This is what
the proverb seeks to say: "Hard cases make bad law."
If on the other hand the type of situation is in the forefront of attention,
a solving rule comes in for much more thoughtful testing and study. Rules are
thrust toward reasonable simplicity, and made with broader vision. Moreover,
the idiosyncracies of the particular case and its possible emotional deflections
are set for judgment against a broader picture which gives a fair chance that
accidental sympathy is not mistaken for long-range justice for all. And one
runs a better chance of skirting the incidence of the other proverb: "Bad law
makes hard cases."
On the case-law side, I repeat, we ought all thus to be familiar with
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the fact that the right doctrine and going practice of our highest courts leave
them a very real leeway within which (a) to narrow or avoid what seem
today to have been unfortunate prior phrasings or even rulings; or (b), on
the other hand, to pick up, develop, expand what seem today to have been
fortunate prior rulings or even phrasings.
It is silly, I repeat, to think of use of this leeway as involving "twisting"
of precedent. The very phrase presupposes the thing which is not and which
has never been. The phrase presupposes that there was in the precedent
under consideration some one and single meaning. The whole experience of
our case-law shows that that assumption is false. It is, instead, the business
of the courts to use the precedents constantly to make the law always a
little better, to correct old mistakes, to recorrect mistaken or ill-advised attempts at correction-but always within limits severely set not only by the
precedents, but equally by the traditions of right conduct in judicial office.
What we need to see now is that all of this is paralleled, in regard to
statutes, because of (1) the power of the legislature both to choose policy
and to select measures; and (2) the necessity that the legislature shall, in so
doing, use language-language fixed in particular words; and (3) the
continuing duty of the courts to make sense, under and within the law.
For just as prior courts can have been skillful or unskillful, clear or
unclear, wise or unwise, so can legislatures. And just as prior courts have
been looking at only a single piece of our whole law at a time, so have legislatures.
But a court must strive to make sense as a whole out of our law as a
whole. It must, to use Frank's figure, 2 take the music of any statute as written
by the legislature; it must take the text of the play as written by the legislature.
But there are many ways to play that music, to play that play, and a court's
duty is to play it well, and, in harmony with the other music of the legal system.
Hence, in the field of statutory construction also, there are "correct,"
unchallengeable rules of "how to read" which lead in happily variant directions.
This must be so until courts recognize that here, as in case-law, the real
guide is Sense-for-All-of-Us. It must be so, so long as we and the courts
pretend that there has been only one single correct answer possible. Until we
give up that foolish pretense there must be a set of mutually contradictory
correct rules on How to Construe Statutes: either set available as duty and
sense may require.
Until then, also, the problem will recur in statutory construction as in
the handling of case-law: Which of the technically correct answers (a) should
be given; (b) will be given-and Why?
And everything said above about the temper of the court, the temper
2. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COL.
L. REv. 1259 (1947).
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of the court's tradition, the sense of the situation and the case, applies here as
well.
Thus in the period of the Grand Style of case-law statutes were construed "freely" to implement their purpose, the court commonly accepting the
legislature's choice of policy and setting to work to implement it. (Criminal
statutes and, to some extent, statutes on procedure, were exceptions.) Whereas in the Formal Period statutes tended to be limited or even eviscerated by
wooden and literal reading, in a sort of long-drawn battle between a balky,
stiff-necked, wrong-headed court and a legislature which had only words
with which to drive that court. Today the courts have regained, in the main,
a cheerful acceptance of legislative choice of policy, but they are still hampered
to some extent in carrying such policies forward by the Formal Period's
insistence on precise language.

One last thing is to be noted:
If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed
purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is
nonsense.
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the
court must do the merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of
the statute-or else substitute its own version of such policy. Creative reshaping of the net result is thus inevitable.
But the policy of a statute is of two wholly different kinds-each kind
somewhat limited in effect by the §tatute's choice of measures, and by the
statute's choice of fixed language. On the one hand there are the ideas consciously before the draftsmen, the committee, the legislature: a known evil to
be cured, a known goal to be attained, a deliberate choice of one line of
approach rather than another. Here talk of "intent" is reasonably realistic;
committee reports, legislative debate, historical knowledge of contemporary
thinking or campaigning which points up the evil or the goal can have
significance.
But on the other hand-and increasingly as a statute gains in age-its
language is called upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated
at the time of its passage. Here the quest is not properly for the sense originally
intended by the statute, for the sense sought originally to be put into it,
but rather for the sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of the
new situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far beyond details known or
knowable at the time of drafting. A "dangerous weapon" statute of 1840 can
include tommy guns, tear gas or atomic bombs. "Vehicle," in a statute of 1840,
can properly be read, when sense so suggests, to include an automobile, or a
hydroplane that lacks wheels. But for all that, the sound quest does not
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run primarily in terms of historical intent. It runs in terms of what the words
can be made to bear, in making sense in the light of the unforeseen.
III
When it comes to presenting a proposed construction in court, there is
an accepted conventional vocabulary. As in argument over points of case-law,
the accepted convention still, unhappily requires discussion as if only one single correct meaning could exist. Hence there are two opposing canons on almost every point. An arranged selection is appended. Every lawyer must be
familiar with them all: they are still needed tools of argument. At least as early
as Fortescue the general picture was clear, on this, to any eye which would see.
Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the
use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a sinple construction
of the available language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of the
statutory language.
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Statutory interpretation still speaks a diplomatic tongue. Here is some of the
technical framework for maneuver.
PARRY

BUT

THRUST

1. A statute cannot go beyond its
text.0

1. To effect its purpose a statute
may be implemented beyond its
text."

2. Statutes in derogation of the
common law will not be extended
by construction.'

2. Such acts will be liberally construed if their nature is remedial.'

3. Statutes are to be read in the
light of the common law and a
statute affirming a common lav rule
is to be construed in accordance
with the common law.7

3. The common law gives way to a
statute which is in consistent with
it and when a statute is designed as.
a revision of a whole body of law
applicable to a given subject it
supersedes the common law.'

3. First National Bank v. DeBerriz, 87 W. Va. 477, 105 S.E. 900 (1921) ; SUTHER(2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes, § 575 (1932).
4. Dooley v. Penn. R.R., 250 Fed. 142 (D. Minn. 1918); 59 C.J., Statutes § 57S

LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 388

(1932).

5. Devers v. City of Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 Atl. 540 (1932) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 113 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 573 (2d ed. 1904) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes § 281 (1919).

6. Becker v. Brown, 65 Neb. 264, 91 N.W. 178 (1902) ;

INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

§ 113 (2d ed.

BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND

1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

88 573-75 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 657 (1932).
7. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); 25 R.C.L., Statutes
§ 280 (1919).
8. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 20 Sup. Ct. 155, 44 L. Ed. 219 (1899) ; State
v. Lewis, 142 N.C. 626, 55 S.E. 600 (1906) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 280, 289 (1919).
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4. Where a foreign statute which
has received construction has been
adopted, previous construction is
adopted too.'

4. It may be rejected where there
is conflict with the obvious meaning of the statute or where the
foreign decisions are unsatisfactory
in reasoning or where the foreign
interpretation is not in harmony
with the spirit or policy of the laws
of the adopting state.1"

5. Where various states have already adopted the statute, the parent
state is followed."

5. Where interpretations of other
states are inharmonious, there is
no such restraint."

6. Statutes in pari inateria must
be construed together."

6. A statute is not in pari matcria
if its scope and aim are distinct or
where a legislative design to depart
from the general purpose or policy
of previous enactments may be apparent."4

7. A statute imposing a new penalty
or forfeiture, or a new liability or
disability, or creating a new right
of action will not be construed as
having a retroactive effect."

7. Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a retroactive
interpretation will promote the ends
of justice, they should receive such
construction."

8. Where design has been distinctly stated no place is left for construction.

8. Courts have the power to inquire into real-as distinct from
ostensible-purpose.""

9. Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873) ;

BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

OF LAWS § 176 (2d ed. 1911) ; 59 C.J., Statutes, §§ 614, 627 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes

§ 294 (1919).

10. Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 45, 20 S.W. 101 (1892); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND
INxTRPRETAT oN OF LAWS § 176 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCnON

§ 404 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 628 (1932).

11. Burnside v. Wand, 170 Mo. 531, 71 S.W. 337 (1902).
12. State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 Pac. 784 (1906).
13. Milner v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 594, 61 S.W.2d 273 (1933); BLACK, CON STRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 104 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIoN §§ 443-48 (2d ed. 1904); 25 R.C.L., Statutes § 285 (1919).
14. Wheelock v. Myers, 64 Kan. 47, 67 Pac. 632 (1902); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 104 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 449 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 CJ., Statutes § 620 (1932).
15. Keeley v. Great Northern Ry., 139 Wis. 448, 121 N.W. 167 (1909); BLACK,
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 119 (2d ed. 1911).
16. Falls v. Key, 278 S.W. 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 120 (2d ed. 1911).
17. Federoff v. Birks Bros., 75 Cal. App. 345, 242 Pac. 885 (1925) ; SUTIERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 358 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 570 (1932).
18. Coulter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 201 Pac. 120 (1921) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 570 (1932).
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9. Definitions and rules of construction contained in an interpretation clause are part of the law
and binding."'

9. Definitions and rules of construction in a statute will not be
extended beyond their necessary
import nor allowed to defeat intention otherwise manifested."

10. A statutory provision requiring liberal construction does not
mean disregard of unequivocal requirements of the statute.2 '

10. Where a rule of construction is
provided within the statute itself
the rule should be applied.22

11. Titles do not control meaning;
preambles do not expand scope;

11. The title may be consulted as a
guide when there is doubt or obscurity in the body; preambles may
be consulted to determine rationale,
and thus the true construction of
terms; section headings may be
looked upon as part of the statute
2
itself. '

section

headings

do

not

change

language. -0

12. If language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect.29

12. Not when literal interpretation
would lead to absurd or mischievous
consequences or thwart manifest
2

purpose. '

13. Words and phrases which have
received judicial construction before enactment are to be understood
according to that construction.

13. Not if the statute clearly requires them to have a different
meaning."9

19. Smith v. State, 28 Ind. 321 (1867) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION
§ 89 (2d ed. 1911) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 567 (1932).

AND INTERPRETATION

OF LAWS

20. h; re Bissell, 245 App. Div. 395, 282 N.Y. Supp. 983 (4th Dep't 1935) ;

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

566 (1932).
21. Los Angeles County v. Payne, 82 Cal. App. 210, 255 Pac. 281 (1927);
LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

SUTHER-

§ 360 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 567 (1932).

22. State ex rel. Triay v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61 (1920);

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

BLACK,

§ 89 (2d ed. 1911); 59 C.J., Statutes §
SUTHERLAND,

§ 360 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J.,,Statutes § 567 (1932).

23. Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 44 S.W. 2d 331 (1931) ; Huntworth v-

Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523 (1915) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF LAWS §§ 83-85 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 339-42Z
(2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 599 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 266-267 (1919).
24. Brown v. Robinson, 275 Mass. 55, 175 N.E. 269 (1931) ; Gulley v. Jackson, 165.

Miss. 103, 145 So. 905 (1933); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS;
§§ 83-85 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 339-42 (2d ed.
1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes §§ 598-99 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 266, 267 (1919).
25. Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 23 L. Ed. 769 (1875) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 51 (2d ed. 1911); 59 C.J., Statutes § 569 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L.,
Statutes §§ 213, 225 (1919).
26. Clark v. Murray, 141 Kan. 533, 41 P.2d 1042 (1935) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 363 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 573 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes,
§§ 214, 257 (1919).
27. Scholze v. Sholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80 (M.S. 1925); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 65 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 363 (2d ed. 1904).
28. Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N.Y. 169, 158 N.E. 63 (1927); BLACK, CONSTRUCTIONAND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 65 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 363 (2d ed. 1904).
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14. After enactment, judicial decision upon interpretation of particular terms and phrases controls."

14. Practical construction by executive officers is strong evidence of
true meaning."

15. Words are to be taken in their
ordinary meaning unless they are
technical terms or words of art. 1

15. Popular words may bear a technical meaning and technical words
may have a popular signification
and they should be so construed.
as to agree with evident intention
or to make the statute operative."

16. Every word and clause must be
given effect."

16. If inadvertantly inserted or if
repugnant to the rest of the statute,
they may be rejected as surplusage."

17. The same language used repeatedly in the same connection is
presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout the statute."

17. This presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary to
assign different meanings to make
the statute consistent."0

18. Words are to be interpreted
according to the proper grammatical
effect of their arrangement within
the statute."

18. Rules of grammar will be disregarded where strict adherence
would defeat purpose."

19. Exceptions not made cannot be
read."

19. The letter is only the "bark."
Whatever is within the reason of the
law is within the law itself."'

29. Eau Claire National Bank v. Benson, 106 Wis. 624, 82 N.W. 604 (1900); BLACK,
93 (2d ed. 1911).
30. State ex rel. Bashford v. Frear, 138 Wis. 536, 120 N.W. 216 (1909); BLACK,
CoNsTRUcrIO
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 94 (2d ed. 1911); 25 R.C.L., Statutes
§ 274 (1919).
31. Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67 S.W.2d 703 (1934); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPETATION OF LAWS § 63 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTEMRLAND, STATUTORY
CONsTRUcTION, §§ 390, 393 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes, §§ 577, 578 (1932).
32. Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex. 382 (1856) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 63 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRUCTION § 395
(2d ed. 1904); 59 C.J., Statutes §§ 577, 578 (1932).
33. In re Terry's Estate, 218 N.Y. 218, 112 N.E. 931 (1916); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION
TATION OF LAWS § 60 (2d ed. 1911); SUTIIERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCAND INTER
TION § 380 (2d ed. 1904).
34. United States v. York, 131 Fed. 323 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); BLACK, CONS'nTCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 60 (2d ed. 1911); SUTIERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 384 (2d ed. 1904).
35. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 Pac. 206 (1929);
BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 53 (2d ed. 1911).
36. State v. Knowles, 90 Md. 646, 45 AtI. 877 (1900); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF LAws § 53 (2d ed. 1911).
37. Harris v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 620, 128 S.E. 578 (1925) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 55 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRucTIoN § 408 (2d ed. 1904).
38. Fisher v. Connard, 100 Pa. 63 (1882) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 55 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIO, § 409 (2d
ed. 1904).
39. Lima v. Cemetery Ass'n, 42 Ohio St. 128 (1884); 25 R.C.L., Statutes § 230
(1919).
40. Flynn v. Prudential Ins. Co., 207 N.Y. 315, 100 N.E. 794 (1913); 59 C.J.,
Statutes § 573 (1932).
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAws §
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20. Expression of one thing excludes another.'

20. The language may fairly comprehend many different cases where
some only are expressly mentioned
by way of example.'

21. General terms are to receive a
general construction."'

21. They may be limited by specific
terms with which they are associated
or by the scope and purpose of the
statute."

22. It is a general rule of construction that where general words
follow an enumeration they are to
be held as applying only to persons
and things of the same general kind
or class specifically mentioned
(ejusdem generis)."

22. General words must operate on
something. Further, ejusdem generis
is only an aid in getting the meaning and does not warrant confining
the operations of a statute within
narrower limits than were intended.'6

23. Qualifying or limiting words
or clauses are to be referred to the
next preceding antecedent. "

23. Not when evident sense and
meaning require a different construction."'

24. Punctuation will govern when a
statute is open to two construc-

24. Punctuation marks will not control the plain and evident meaning
of language." °

0

tions."

41. Detroit v. Redford Twp., 253 Mich. 453, 235 N.W. 217 (1931);
STRUcTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

CONSTRUCTION

§§ 491-94 (2d ed. 1904).

§ 72 (2d ed. 1911);

BLACK, CoN-

SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY

42. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 Sup. Ct. 480, 72 L. Ed. 845
(1928); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 72 (2d ed. 1911);
§ 495 (2d ed. 1904).
43. De Witt v. San Francisco, 2 Cal. 289 (1852); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND

SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 68 (2d ed. 1911); 59 C.J., Statutes § 580 (1932).
44. People ex rel. Krause v. Harrison, 191 Ill. 257, 61 N.E. 99 (1901); BLACK,
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25. It must be assumed that language hag been chosen with due regard to grammatical propriety and
is not interchangeable on mere conjecture&

25. "And" and "or" may be read
interchangeably
whenever
the
change is necessary to give the
statute sense and effect."'

26. There is a distinction between
words of permission and mandatory
words."

26. Words imparting permission
may be read as mandatory and
words imparting command may be
read as permissive when such construction is made necessary by evident intention or by the rights of
the public."'

27. A proviso qualifies the provision immediately preceding."

27. It may clearly be intended to
have a wider scope."

28. When the enacting clause is
general, a proviso is construed
strictly.Y

28. Not when it is necessary to extend the proviso to persons or cases
which come within its equity."
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THE LAW-MAKING FUNCTION OF THE JUDGE*
Albert Tate, Jr.**

Law students are no longer surprised by an admission that
our judges sometimes create law-rules as well as apply them.
Indeed, perhaps law schools overrate the influence of social
policy upon the decisional process. The settled rule governs
almost all the area of everyday law practice, and the vast millrun of litigation neither requires nor allows much free play of
judicial discretion. In the trial court only the rare case involves
the uncertain rule rather than the uncertain application of a
rule itself indisputable. Even in the appellate courts, which
decide the borderline litigation of many law practices and of
many trial courts, only a small minority1 of cases involve respectable discretion to select the decisive law-rule.
My remarks concern the law-making function of the appellate judge, but they must be viewed in this context. To single
out this limited judicial role must necessarily overemphasize
its quantitative importance. Nor at this late date can novelty
of theme enhance any discussion of rule-creation by judges.2
What, then, may justify yet another glance at this now familiar
text?
Over the past thirteen years of experience as a state appellate judge I have come to see that law-improvement functions
are an inescapable part of the duties of an appellate court.
Though they be minor quantitatively, these functions are quali* A

paper delivered April 22, 1967, at ceremonies inducting the writer

as an honorary member of the Order of the Coif at the Law School of
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
** Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, on leave
of absence to serve as Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law
School, 1967-68. The writer is indebted for research and editorial assistance
to A. Lynn Wright, II, law clerk to the Third Circuit 1966-67, member of
the Calcasieu and Orleans Bars.
1. Commencing with an estimate of CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
60 (1924), somewhat corroborated by similar estimates from other sources,
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS 25

(1960)

and

Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 256
(1961), the currently fashionable guess is that perhaps 10 percent of the
caseload of major appellate courts permit choice of the applicable lawrule in accordance with the social value of those rules permissibly applicable. Cf., e.g., Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer Newly Become Judge, 71
YALE L.J. 218, 222 (1961).
2. See, e.g., Symposium, The Changing Role of the Judiciary in the
Development of Law, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 761-955 (1961), as well as sources
cited in note 1 supra.
[211]
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tatively important, for they aid the law to keep alive and current and responsive to the changing needs of our society. The
subject of judicial creativity has become a sensitive subject
during these same years, when the national Supreme Court's
recent constitutional rulings, unpopular with many as to substantive result, have been attacked as unwarranted judicial legislation. My hope is that by discussion of the judicial lawchoosing role in its more humdrum day-to-day aspects-as it
affects a state appellate court disposing of its ever increasing
docket of mostly private disputes-we may note that law-creation
functions performed by appellate courts are not exercised in
derogation of the paramount law-making power vested in the
legislatures but rather as a necessary supplement to it.
Let me at the outset repeat the usual disclaimers. The proper
function of the courts is to adjudicate, not to legislate; the legislature is and must be the ultimate and paramount source of
law. Inevitably, however, the adjudicative process in American
jurisdictions requires that on occasion the courts create or modify a general rule in order to decide a dispute pending before
the courts. Indeed, historically, our Constitution and customs envisage that the courts will perform law revision and law adaptation functions in order to maintain the coherency and currency
of the law. Nevertheless, in the small proportior of cases in
which judicial law-creation is appropriate, such power must be
exercised subject to traditional restraints and more to accord
with the reasoned development of pre-existing doctrine than to
express any personal philosophy of the judges.
In further preliminary, we will limit the ambit of our discussion. We will not now consider the various philosophical
concepts which divide legal philosophers. We will instead accept
as our present working definition that the law is simply the
rules of substance or procedure by which the courts decide
cases before them. 3 Thus, for present purposes we will assume
that law-rules formulated by judicial decisions represent judicial law-making, disregarding the civilian concept that judicial
decisions are only interpretations and that law results from
legislation alone. 4 Also, we will focus our view on private lawthe judicial law-making responsibility arising from the decision
3. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 84 (2d ed. 1921; Beacon
Press reprint, 1963).
4. See sources cited in Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in
Louisiana, 22 LA. L. Rv. 727 (1962).
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of disputes between private persons to settle private rights and
liabilities. By doing so, we will attempt to avoid the emotioncharged atmosphere surrounding the duty of the courts to decide
public-law questions of policy and constitutional interpretation.
Our concern will thus be with the courts' law-making function
in the development of the "lawyer's law" of the quiet law
libraries, not the "political law" of the bustling legislature or
of the strident street corners.
I
Before we generalize about judicial law-making, it may be
well to illustrate one of the aspects of the problem by a specific
example.
When I was a member of the old Louisiana First Circuit,
in 1957, we were faced in Alexander v. General Acc. Fire & Life
Assur. Corp.5 with an issue never before explicitly decided by
any previous Louisiana decision-the standard of care owed by
a host to a social guest injured through some defect of the
host's premises (in this case a carelessly attached runner-rug
in a dark hall). No statute of our legislature directly regulated
the matter. The only legislation applicable was our Civil Code's
general provision obliging those who cause damage through
"fault" to pay for it.6
Under the common law of England and the court-made law
of most American jurisdictions, a host generally owes to a social
guest only the duty to warn him of latent dangers the host
actually knows about. 7 This is to be contrasted with the care

required of the host for almost all other invitees, to whom his
duty includes an affirmative responsibility to warn of or to
correct latent defects which are reasonably discoverable-in
short, to take reasonable precautions against undue risk of
reasonably foreseeable harm, the usual duty owed in most areas
of negligence law. The courts of other states had applied this
common-law social-guest rule over a current of dissent. Some
tort scholars felt that the host should owe the guest in his home
the same duty not to injure him negligently through premise
defects as he admittedly owed to business callers-or for that
5. 98 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
6. LA. CivuL Cons art. 2315 (1870).
7. PROSSER, TORTS § 60, at 387-88 (3d ed. 1964); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598
(1952).
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matter, to the social guest himself for negligently inflicted injuries not caused by defective premises. 8
In 1957, then, this question of law, the duty of a host to a
social guest for premise defects, came before our court for
decision in the Alexander case. Even though there were no
Louisiana statutes or decisions to guide us, we as a court nevertheless had to decide the case. To do so, of course, we had to
select and apply some rule of law based upon no previous Louisiana authority and to set this forth in a reasoned opinion to
be published. We could not, for instance, withhold action indefinitely until the legislature might act on the question, if ever.
In this situation, should we, in selecting the law-rule to
apply, choose the old English common-law rule followed by
most American jurisdictions? If we did, should we do so without consideration of whether it was better than the ordinarycare rule preferred by many scholars, simply because most
other American courts had chosen the English rule to apply?
Or should we instead choose from the two law-rules that one
which we thought to be the fairer and more socially useful, the
more consistent with the general body of tort law and with
standards of behavior and social expectations in twentiethcentury America?
As my loaded questions suggest, our court did not select
the preponderant English-American social guest rule. We felt
that the rule recommended by some modern scholars to be the
better, and the one more consistent with the general body of
Louisiana law and the general social conditions of today. A few
years later, our State Supreme Court approved and applied the
social guest standard adopted in the Alexander case.9
But the story is not ended yet. A further development with
regard to our social-guest law-rule exemplifies that the scope
of judicial law-making is always subject to oversight and review
by the legislature.
Following our 1957 decision in Alexander, there was no
legislative reaction. However, in Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau
8. As in the cases of food furnished the guest or driving the guest to
and from the host's home. See authorities discussed and cited in Alexander
v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 98 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957); and in PROSSER, TORTS §§ 60, 61 (3d ed. 1964).
9. Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250 La. 847, 195 So.2d 6836 (1967). See
also Comment, 27 LA. L. Rsv. 796 (1967).
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Cas. Ins. Co.10 in 1962, the Louisiana Third Circuit, upon which
I was then sitting, held a host camp owner's liability insurer
liable to a social guest for a fall resulting from a defective condition of a fishing camp porch. It was indeed a close question;
an invitation to a hunting and fishing camp does not carry with
it the same assurance of the safety of the premises as could be
expected from an invitation to a home. Nevertheless, a majority
of our court felt that the hazard in question, producing a really
serious injury, was unreasonable in view of its concealment from
ordinary observation. We therefore affirmed recovery. In the
next regular session of the legislature, a statute was enacted to
provide that no owner or occupant of property was under any
duty to keep premises safe for use "by others for hunting, fishing, camping, hiking, sight-seeing, or boating," and also that
by any permission given to others "to enter the premises for
such recreational purposes he [the owner] does not thereby extend any assurance that the premises are safe . . .-', Thus, the
legislature overruled our social-guest law-rule insofar as it applied to non-commercial recreational premises.
We might well conclude from this prompt legislative reaction that, while the legislature disapproved of the Daire fishingcamp application of the Alexander rule, it did approve and
accept Alexander's general rule that a host owed ordinary care
to a social guest in usual circumstances. The legislative inactivity
following the 1957 Alexander decision, as contrasted with the
prompt legislative reaction to the 1962 Daire holding, lends
further support to this thesis.
These theoretical deductions are of course largely imaginary.
Although the deductions possess an element of general plausibility, the truth of the matter, almost certainly, is that few if
any of the 150 legislators serving in 1957 or at any of the subsequent sessions had heard of either the Alexander or the Daire
decisions. With the many other more important public questions
and the hundreds and hundreds of legislative bills and resolutions for them to consider and dispose of, the rather rare plight
of the injured social guest or of his host was simply not grave
enough to occupy much if any of the attention of any but a
few. The legislature's prompt reaction to Daire resulted from
a collision with the interests of hunting groups and the politically
10. 143 So.2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
11. LA. R.S. 9:2791 (Supp. 1966). The enactment excluded commercial
enterprises from those exempted from liability for premise defect.
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articulate farm bureau, who immediately secured legislative
revision, rather than from any programmed scanning of the
advance sheets by busy legislators to note judicial decisions
needing legislative correction. I do not say this in any demeaning
vein, for almost all legislation results from the push of interests
adversely affected by current conditions. 12 The observation is
made simply to keep in perspective the milieu within which
legislative oversight of appellate jurisprudence takes place.
Simultaneously, we do emphasize that the legislature through
its policy deciding primacy may simply overrule the rare case
where a judicially created rule or its application is sufficiently
displeasing or important to warrant legislative attention.
II
Let us now consider more closely the function of our court
in selecting the law-rule to apply in Alexander.
As an appellate court, our role was to decide this pending
litigation by a written reasoned opinion. We need now do no
more than note briefly the function of the reasoned opinion to
assure that legal disputes of similarly situated interests are decided in accordance with consistent principles. But the requirement of a reasoned opinion had as its consequence that our court
in Alexander could not simply decide for the plaintiff or for the
defendant without stating the legal reasons for the result. Our
duty thus required us to formulate a law-rule for the result we
reached, even though no previous Louisiana case and no Louisiana statute provided us with one for mechanical application.
Consider further the resultant implication that, as with all
appellate opinions in Louisiana, our eventual decision and our
reasoning in Alexander would be published in the Southern
Reporter. Of course, this must be to guide litigants and the trial
courts within the reviewing jurisdiction that the same appellate court will ordinarily decide a similar question similarly
should it be brought before that court in the future. Based upon
this expectation, lawyers will advise clients in the regulation
of their affairs and in the disposition of unlitigated disputes.
Based upon it, trial courts will decide them. The bulk of these
trial decisions will not result in any appeal; in the event of
appeal, it is most probable that the same appellate court will
12. See, e.g., Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. RPv. 749 (1965).
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not see fit to re-examine and change the law-rule created by
its own precedent.
I mention these obvious circumstances to emphasize again
what all lawyers know and what few laymen can deny: That
the ordinary and customary operation of our judicial process
requires the courts on occasion to create law-rules where needed
to decide the case, and that these law-rules operate with prospective effect to regulate the clashes of similar interests in the
future, in much the same manner (although more limited in
scope) as does a new statute.
In choosing or creating the law-rule to apply, few, it seems
to me, will suggest that the choice or creation should be exercised by logic or deduction or jurisdiction-counting alone. I suppose almost all will agree that, where the judge is given discretion to select or devise the law-rule to apply, the rule's practical
wisdom, general fairness, and future usefulness to society are
considerations which should influence the judge, 18 albeit the
judge's discretion is circumscribed by the usual necessity that
the new rule be an extension generally consistent with preexisting legal doctrine, as well as by traditional limitations upon
the judiciary's exercise of its historic law-making powers.
In Louisiana, our Civil Code specifically authorizes the
courts to do so. Article 2114 provides: "In all civil matters,
where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed
and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal
is made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where
positive law is silent." To the same effect, but perhaps more
explicit, is a provision of the Swiss Civil Code: "The statute
governs all the matters within the letter or spirit of any of its
provisions. In the absence of any applicable statutory provisions,
the judge shall decide according to customary law, and in its
absence according to rules he would enact as a legislator. In
this he shall follow the established doctrine and decisional law."'15
Even without such legislative mandate, I suggest, courts do or
should follow this approach in devising the law-rule by which
to decide the unprovided-for case.
13. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-41 (1921); GANY,
METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE INSTITUTE) (1963), summarized and reviewed in Tate, Book Review, 25 LA. L. REV. 577 (1956).
14. LA. CIVIL CODE (1870).
15. SWISS CIVIL CODE art. 1 (1907).
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III
Judicial creation of a law-rule is obviously necessary to
decide a question not provided for by legislation. Closely akin
to this situation, but much more common, is the duty thrust
upon the courts by the volume of new legislation to synthesize
it within the body of pre-existing law.
Where legislation represents a fully integrated and comprehensive scheme of regulation, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, the courts cannot and should not weigh policy
considerations or use creative interpretation in the application
of the statutory command. But much legislation is piecemeal,
sometimes hastily or inadvertently drafted, often without consideration of competing or overlapping or inconsistent enactments. In these instances, the courts must perform, and the
legislature intends for them to do so, the function of integrating
the interpretation of the statute into the general body of the
law, or coordinating its principle with others applicable, and of
limiting the statute or extending it according to its intended
purpose (for the literal words often permit either broad or
narrow applications, the circumference of the statute not being
discernible from the words themselves). 1 The courts are thus
contemplated as a complementary law-making institute to rationalize isolated statutes in accord with their intended purpose
and to permit them to serve as reasoned principle within a
coherent and intelligible framework of general law.
An example given by one observer is the married women's
emancipation acts of many jurisdictions.1 7 Although usually the
statute itself merely granted married women the right to sue
and be sued and to own and convey property, the incidental
results of this change of status forced the courts to reconsider
and redetermine the tort liability of the spouses to each other
as well as to third persons for the other spouse's torts, as well
as other law-rules in other areas of law not ostensibly affected
by the sparse terms of the emancipation act itself.
16. See Breitel, The Courts and Law Making, in LEaAL INSTITUTIONS
TODAY AND TOMORROW 1 (Paulsen ed. 1959); Professor Hart's "comment" on
the Breitel paper, id. at 40-48; Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the
Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414 (1961).
17. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD ESSAYS 223-24

(1934). Dean Landis' other illustrations concern general law changes resulting from specific enactment relating to inheritance-by-illegitimates, wrongful deaths, and trade union statutes.
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A recent Louisiana example leaps to mind. In 1960, the legislature revised Article 2103 of our Civil Code.18 The specific intent
solely expressed by the Louisiana State Law Institute recommendation with the 1960 amendment was "to provide a substantive law base for the enforcement of contribution among
joint tortfeasors" and to overrule prior jurisprudence to the
contrary. 19
In the application of the new statute a host of issues arose
for which the statutory provisions furnished no guide. Some of
them involved a conflict between the new statute and principles
established by prior legislation not necessarily intended to be
affected by the new statute. For instance, by a former statutory
provision interspousal immunity is established, so that neither
spouse can sue the other. Did the new contribution statute
permit, in a wife's suit against a tortfeasor, such defendant to
demand contribution from the husband (on the ground that the
wife's injuries were produced by the husband's contributing
fault as a joint tortfeasor), thus permitting the wife to recover
indirectly from her husband what she was directly prohibited
by the earlier statute from recovering? 20 Again, a statutory provision of the workmen's compensation statute exempts an employer from non-compensation (e.g., tort) liability to an employee injured in an employment accident. Does it likewise
still apply so as to exempt the employer when he is called upon,
under the provisions of the new statute, as a joint tortfeasor
solidarily bound to contribute to recovery against another tortfeasor liable to his workman's survivors in tort. 21 Or, if one
tortfeasor attempts to implead another party as joint tortfeasor
by third-party demand as authorized by the new statute, can
that third-party defendant plead a release between it and the
plaintiff as freeing it from the obligation of contribution, thus
relying upon prior statutes providing, as between claimant and
codebtor, for the claimant's obligation to deduct the part formerly owed by a released codebtor (and does this "part" refer
to the monetary amount or to the fractional proportion) ?22
18. La. Acts 1960, No. 30.
19. La. Civil Code Ann. art. 2103, reporter's note at 85 (West Supp. 1966).
See also Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 22 LA. L. REV.
818 (1962) and Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortleasors: Louisianava
Past, Present and Future, 37 TUL. L. REV. 525 (1963).
20. Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So.2d
122 (1965), reversing 164 So.2d 647 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
21. Hebert v. Blankenship, 187 So.2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
22. Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So.2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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Again, with regard to suits instituted prior to the effective date
of the new contribution statute, are the rights created by the
24
28
new statute substantive or procedural, or is this material,
with regard to the retroactivity or not in application of the new
statute?
I sat as a member of the court called upon to decide these
sometimes complex questions arising from the collision of the
concepts of the new statute with those provided by former
legislation. If the new enactment had clearly been intended to
govern, of course there was no problem-we were simply to
apply the later legislation. However, there was no legislative
indication that the new statute should supersede the earlier
legislative principles not directly within its scope. We would
abdicate the judicial function by simply applying the later legislation on some mechanical rule that the latest enactment must
always supersede all earlier statutes even arguably affected,
without attaching any relevance to whether this later enactment was really intended to apply.
And I should at this point state that the legislative "intent"
or its absence was in the instances noted largely imaginaryfor (and we were fortunate to have a Law Institute recommendation specifically ascribing legislative purpose, unlike for the
bulk of legislation) it was quite obvious that, in furnishing the
new principle that one joint tortfeasor is allowed a substantive
base to enforce contribution from another, the legislature had
not remotely contemplated the surrounding questions which
arose when the new principle was to be introduced into the
context of pre-existing law. In such instances, the legislature
must expect the courts to formulate the synthesizing rules, by
which the new legislative principle will, in coordination and
harmony with prior laws, serve socially useful aims consistent
so far as possible with related legal doctrine. In so doing, it is
the courts which will make the policy-determinations as to which
of the legislative principles shall be accorded priority, and it
is the' courts which must create from the competing statutes that
new law-rule which will synthesize what in the court's judgment is the wisest rule to apply in the penumbra area created
by the overlapping of the statutory principles.
23. Brown v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 So.2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961), cert. granted.
24. Brown v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 243 La. 271, 142 So.2d 796 (1962),
reversing 136 So.2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).

Page 45 of 93

1968]

221

LAW-MAKING FUNCTION OF THE JUDGE

Iv
Many observers believe that additionally, as a constitutionally contemplated judicial responsibility, the courts must
more general and more pervaexercise a law-revision function 25
sive than those so far illustrated.
In his classic work, The Nature of the Judicial Process,
Cardozo quoted Professor Arthur Corbin, a distinguished scholar,
as follows: "It is the function of courts to keep the doctrines
up to date with the mores by continual restatement and by
giving them a continually new content. This is judicial legislation, and the judge legislates at his peril. Nevertheless, it is
the necessity and duty of such legislation that gives a judicial
office its highest honor; and 26no brave and honest judge shirks
the duty or fears the peril.
Cardozo continued: "You may say that there is no assurance
that judges will interpret the mores of their day more wisely
and truly than other men. I am not disposed to deny this, but
in my view it is quite beside the point. The point is rather that
this power of interpretation must be lodged somewhere, and the
custom of the constitution has lodged it in the judges. If they
are to fulfill their function as judges, it could hardly be lodged
elsewhere. The recognition of this power and duty to shape the
law in conformity with the customary morality is something
far removed from the destruction of all rules and substitution
in every instance of the individual sense of justice . .

.

. The

form and structure of the organism are fixed. The cells in which
there is motion do not change the proportions of the mass.
Insignificant is the power of innovation of any judge, when
compared with the bulk and pressure of the rules that hedge
him on every side. Innovate, however, to some extent, he must,
for with new conditions there must be new rules.""
Especially in the area of private law, over the decades the
legislatures have been content for the courts to perform their
traditional judicial function to modify and revise law concepts
25. See, e.g., Breitel, The Courts and Law Mak~ing, in LnoAL INmwruToNs
TODAY AND TOMORROW 1 (Paulsen ed. 1959); Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-

A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 TEXAS L. REv.
1254 (1966); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy (1956), reprinted in 34 U. Cm.
L. REv. 3 (1966).
26. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 135 (1921), quoting from
29 YALE L.J. 771 (1920).
27. Id. 135-37.
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and applications to suit the changing conditions of newer times.
The legislature could not, practically, perform such a function
itself, with its limited time and facilities. Indeed, some observers
have pointed out that legislation is often a later attempt to
generalize the regulation of social disputes which had first
emerged in litigation initially decided by courts alone-that
legislation is as much a reaction to judicial decision, as judicial
decisions are to legislation, with the courts often providing the
first initiative toward principled regulation of a social situation
through piecemeal case-by-case improvisation resolving the early
varied facets of the emerging problems. 28 Of course, as the
legislative treatment of our Third Circuit decision in Daire illustrates, judicial law-making is subject to veto or modification by
the legislature. The legislature's primacy in law-making must
always be recognized, even though the courts do perform important subsidiary and complementary law-making duties.
V
Perhaps a detailed case-study of this general law-revision
function in operation may illustrate that it is not usurpatory of
the legislature's power but rather supplementary to it and a
necessary consequence of the judicial function in contemporary
America.
Of the many examples of continuous judicial revision to
keep the law useful and fair as applied to current conditions, to
me one of the most illustrative for Louisiana is the treatment
by our State Supreme Court of the "assured clear distance"
rule.2 In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Saia,80 that court in
1937 affirmed the dismissal of a suit which alleged that the
plaintiff's truck had run into an unlighted truck and trailer
parked on the public highway on a dark night. The court held
28. Gellhorn, The Legislative and the Administrative Response, 17 VAND.
L. Rsv. 91, 96-97 (1963); Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD EssAYs 213, at 230 (1934).

29. The Work of the Loufsiana Supreme Court for the 1958-59 Term-

Torts, 19 LA. L. REv. 338 (1959); for the 1956-57 Term, 18 LA. L. REv. 68
(1957); for the 1958-54 Term, 17 LA. L. REv. 345 (1957). In these commentaries,

Professor Malone suggests that we should frankly realize that the old
"assured clear distance" rule has been modified to reflect modern conditions,
so that "'the duty could not be appropriately described as one merely obliging the driver to maintain such control and speed as will enable him to
bring his car to a reasonable stop if faced with a sudden obstruction in his
path of travel.'"
30. 188 La. 358, 177 So. 238 (1937).
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that at night "the driver of an automobile is guilty of negligence
in driving at a rate of speed greater than that in which he could
stop within the range of his vision." 31 The only statute relied
upon by the court was the provision requiring that every
vehicle operated on the public highways after dark be equipped
with headlights sufficient to render clearly discernible any
person on the highway for a distance of 200 feet ahead.8 2 The
court felt that the plaintiff's negligence was not excused by the
defendant's failure to comply with another statutory provision
prohibiting the parking of an obstructing vehicle on the highway after dark without appropriate signal lights. 88
Nevertheless, just twelve years later, in Dodge v. Bituminous Cas. Corp.,34 the same court found an oncoming night
motorist free of negligence when he did not see the defendant's
unlighted parked truck until he was too close to avoid colliding
with it, because his visibility ahead was disturbed by the burning lights of oncoming traffic. Without referring to the statutory
headlight-provision relied upon in Saia, the court simply stated
that the parking of the defendant's truck on the highway, without lights or signals in violation of the statutory provision
brushed aside by Saia, was "the proximate cause of the collision." 35 As the court's summary in the opinion of statutory history illustrates, there had been no intervening change in the
substance of the statutory regulation since the Saia decision.86
The majority opinion stated, incidentally, that in the absence of
express statute "the court may adopt theoretical standards from
common sense experience for the insuring of the safety of the
road. '8 7 A dissent in Dodge noted that the holding was at variance with the court's 1937 decision in Saia, which was neither
discussed nor even cited in Dodge's majority opinion. The dissent also pointed out that there were no exceptional circumstances as in Gaiennie v. Cooperative Prod. Co.,88 which ten
years earlier had established an exception to the harsh application of the "assured clear distance" rule enunciated by Saia.
31. Id. at 361, 177 So. at 239.
32. La. Acts 1932, No. 21, § 9(g)(1), (12). These are the predecessor provisions of those enacted by La. Acts 1962, No. 310.
33. La. Acts 1932, No. 21, § 3(rule 15). The equivalent provision is now
found In LA. R.S. 32-141 (1950), as reenacted by La. Acts 1932, No. 310.
34. 214 La. 1031, 39 So.2d 720 (1949).
35. Id. at 1039, 39 So.2d at 723.
36. Id. at 1038, 39 So.2d at 722-23.
37. Id. at 1038, 39 So.2d at 723.
38. 196 La. 417, 199 So. 377 (1940).
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And so it continued, with the most recent expressions of
our Supreme Court holding flatly that "a motorist traveling by
night is not charged with the duty of guarding against striking
an unexpected or unusual obstruction, which he had no reason
to anticipate he would encounter on the highway."3 9 For this
reason, these Supreme Court opinions and numerous intermediate court opinions 40 have held night motorists who run into
obstructing vehicles parked unlighted upon the highway to be
free of contributory negligence, despite the night motorists'
failure to slow when their powers of perception are disturbed
by the lights of oncoming traffic.
With regard to the two most recent opinions of the Supreme
Court, Suire v. Winters (1957)41 and Vowell v. Manufacturers

Cas. Ins. Co. (1956) ,42 no change of substance in the statutory
provisions in effect at the time of the Saia decision in 1937 had
taken place in the interval. 43 What has changed are the context
social conditions, especially the conditions of travel at night.
With better highways and with better vehicles, it became safe
to drive at higher speeds. It became more dangerous to obstruct
normal night traffic by darkened obstacles. For instance, while
earlier statutes of 187044 and 191441 had provided nominal mis-

demeanor penalties for blocking a road, our Criminal Code of
1942 provided for imprisonment of up to 15 years for the intentional obstruction of a highway foreseeably endangering
human life.46 Thus, under more modern conditions, night motorists are to a large extent entitled to assume that other persons
will not criminally obstruct the highway by unlighted vehicles
and cause such a great hazard to the ordinary traffic of the
present day.
39. Suire v. Winters, 233 La. 585, 97 So.2d 404, 408 (1957); Vowell v.
Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 229 La. 798, 808-09, 86 So.2d 909, 913 (1956).
40. Arnold v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 190 So.2d 261 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1966); Woods v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 172 So.2d 100 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied; Edwards v. Trahan, 168 So.2d 365 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964); Graham v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 159 So.2d 333 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied; Mose v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania,
134 So.2d 312 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied; Fontenot v. LaFleur, 124
So.2d 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied.
41. 233 La. 585, 97 So.2d 404 (1957).
42. 229 La. 798, 86 So.2d 909 (1956).
43. The statutory provisions in effect at the time of these decisions are
found in LA. R.S. 32:241 (1950) (no obstructing at night without signal
lights) and LA. R.S. 32:290, 301 (1950) (vehicles operated at night to be
equipped with headlights making discernible a person 200 feet ahead).
44. LA. R.S. § 3379 (1870).
45. La. Acts 1914, No. 240.
46. La. Acts No. 43, § 1 (art. 96); LA. R.S. 14:86 (1950).
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The erosion of the "assured clear distance" rule was accomplished by conscientious judges of our Supreme Court and of
our lower courts who realized that the old rule applied literally
was no longer a practical or a fair regulation of the nighttime
speed of modern drivers of modern cars on modern highways.
The judges faced up to the circumstances that a negligence rule
designed mainly for regulation of forty-mile-an-hour traffic on
gravel roads was not a sound basis for deciding the rights of
drivers and passengers several decades later, under the vastly
changed conditions of later times. They therefore modified the
previous law-rule they had applied, so as to base the standard
of care exacted of the nighttime driver not on a mechanical rule
but instead upon the particular circumstances, the apparent risk,
and the driver's opportunity to deal with it. This, I might add,
is paralleled by similar erosion of the "assured clear distance"
47
rule in many other American jurisdictions.
VI
Before we leave our discussion of the treatment by the
Louisiana courts of the "assured clear distance" rule we should
analyze the relationship of the court decisions to relevant legislation.
The courts were deciding whether either or both vehicle
operators were at fault in a nighttime rear-end collision, in
order to determine pecuniary liability for the damages sustained.
The courts cited provisions of the highway regulatory acts
which prohibited parking at night on the highway without lights
or which required headlights of a certain efficiency for vehicles
operated at night; but in truth the courts were not enforcing
these legislative provisions. Rather, they were performing their
function to allocate civil liability for fault under the entirely
separate and distinct provision of our Civil Code obliging those
who caused damage through "fault" to pay for it.48
The provisions of the highway regulatory acts do not provide that persons who obstruct the highway by parking an unlighted vehicle upon it at night are liable for damages to other
vehicles which ran into the darkened obstacles. 49 Likewise, the
provision that vehicles must be operated on the highway at
47. Prosser, Torts § 37, at 211 (3d ed. 1964).
48. LA. CVL CODE art. 2315 (1870).
49. See, e.g., one of the substantially similar provisions of the successive
statutes, LA. R.S. 32:241 (1950).
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nighttime with headlights of a given visibility does not provide that a driver who fails to observe an object in his path
within the requisite distance of visibility is or is not at fault.50
The only sanction specifically provided for violations of the
motor vehicle regulatory act is a criminal penalty of minor fine
or imprisonment."' Nevertheless, by a process of analogy, the
courts deduced from the highway regulatory acts a standard
of conduct, a law-rule for decision, by which to determine private disputes as to who should pay between those who collide
on the highways at night. We must emphasize, however, that
it was not a legislative rule but rather a court-made rule of law
which was used to decide the question of who should pay for
damages caused by these collisions. No legislative act provided
that a violation should be any indicia of civil liability or have
the effect of barring recovery, although the courts reasonably
concluded that a legislative regulation designed to assure highway safety indicated a standard of conduct required by ordinary
care in usual circumstances.
Thus, quite often statutes are generalizations which the legislature intends for the courts to extend and complete insofar as
they may afford principles for the determination of civil litigation in the different contexts of varying facts and later times.
The highway regulatory acts provide explicit commands to police
agencies to prevent cars parking or driving at night without
adequate lights. The acts do not, however, provide explicit commands to the courts to allocate civil liability for accidents resulting from failure to obey the highway regulations. The legislature
did not, for instance, provide that no one parking on the highway
at night without lights could recover damages for injuries thereby caused; if it had, judicial inquiry as to an obstructor's fault
barring recovery would be barred. However, rather than specifying myriad factual situations in which violation might or
might not be fault for purposes of determining any post-accident
civil liability, the legislature instead left this function to be performed by the courts in their historic duty to particularize legislative generalizations.
Again, in determining the tort liability of the various litigants, the sole legislative standard provided was that he who
caused damage through "fault" should pay for it. By the use of
50. See LA. R.S. 32:290, 301 (1950).
51. Id. 32:57; see former law, id. 32:361-62, and La. Acts 1832, No. 21, § 13.
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this general term "fault," the legislature delegated to the courts
the duty to develop a series of standards for the more particularized and varied type-situations of everyday life and, further,
the function of individualizing these applications to the countless gradations and permutations of event and conduct which can
be expected in a living society which must also inevitably
change with the decades. Emphasizing again, therefore, that
the courts must enforce the explicit command of statutes in
order to accomplish their intended purpose, we must also point
out that quite often the statute does not so much as command
but suggest. The legislative suggestion, moreover, may intentionally invite the courts to fashion the more particularized lawrules used to decide the various type-situations of civil litigation.
It may contemplate that the courts will individualize the application of the legislative standard in accordance with exceptional
unforeseen circumstance and that the courts will harmonize the
application of the statutory principles to accord with the social
and jurisprudential context of the times in which subsequent
litigation may arise.
VII
Is it ever proper for a court to ignore the express words of a
statute seemingly applicable?
Let me reiterate once again, before we embark upon this
sensitive topic, that the courts must acknowledge without reservation the legislature's paramount control of law-making and
policy-decision. Whether the judges personally agree or disagree with legislation, they must enforce it according to its purpose. Under the guise of interpretation, they should not thwart
the legislative aims because they disfavor them. In legal history,
unfortunate instances may be found where by literal mechanical application of precise statutory language hostile judges
thwarted the statutory purpose. 52 But these instances also indicate that legislators, in passing a statute, do not intend to enact
words merely but, more, the principles enclosed in those words.
Holmes has somewhere said that words are the skins of
ideas. It is these ideas which the legislature intends to put into
effect; the words are merely auxiliaries used for that purpose.
Thus, when application of literal wording leads to an absurd or
52. Frank, Words and Music, Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,

47 COLUM. L. REv. 1259 (1947).

Page 52 of 93

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. XXVIII

unreasonable result, the literal application has been disregarded
by Louisiana courts, because, in the words of Justice Martin in
an 1840 decision, "even where a law is clear and unambiguous,
the letter may be disregarded with the honest intention of
seeking its spirit.153 We know that this principle of interpretation must be used sparingly. It does illustrate, however, that
the sanctity of legislation does not attach to the word-formula
used but rather to the regulatory principle expressed by those
words. The essential authority of legislation derives not from
the printing of words on paper; it proceeds rather from its
enactment as the will of the people adopted by the people's
legislators chosen for that purpose. In applying legislation, the
courts do so in accord with the legislative purpose and in order
thus to carry out the represented will of the people.
Legislation is enacted to regulate the social and legal environment of a living society. As G6ny points out, to apply it to
unforeseen or substantially changed conditions of other times,
even though the original statutory purpose is no longer served,
is to apply mechanically an abstract formula which no longer
represents the will of the legislature. 54 Thus, our Louisiana Civil
Code provides that "Law is a solemn expression of legislative
will."5r, Although our Code likewise states that "when a law is
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit," 56 the principle thus codified is not, as Planiol notes, intended to require
mechanical application of the rigid word-text of a statute to
situations not foreseen by the legislature, since "the cause of the
law ceasing, the law ceases. ' 57 Further, as earlier noted, our
Civil Code expressly provides that "In all civil matters, where
there is no express law [i.e., no enactment of the legislative will
intended expressly to apply], the judge is bound to proceed and
decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is
made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent."5 8 (Emphasis added.)
53. Ardry v. Ardry, 16 La. 264, 268 (1840).
54. G NY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW

(TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE)
55. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1 (1870).

§§

51-59, 92-108 (1963).

56. Id. art. 13.
57. 1 PLANIOL; CIVIL WAR TREATISE (AN

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY THE Lou-

ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) Nos. 216, 217, 224, 224A (1959). The maxim translated in the text is quoted in Planiol as "Cessante causa legi , cessat lex."
See, e. g., State ex rel. Thompson v. Department of City Civil Service

214 La. 683, 38 So.2d 385 (syllabus 2) (1948).
58. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 21 (1870).
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In essence, then, the words of legislation contain a principle
of regulation intended by the legislators to apply to contemplated
norms of their own and succeeding times. But if there is a substantial change in the social conditions the statute is designed
to regulate, the mechanical adjudication by reference to the
statute's literal wording alone may, under the changed conditions, amount to an irresponsible application of a legal rule
devised neither by legislative intention nor by the deciding court.
Early in my judicial career occurred what to me still is a
dramatic illustration of responsible judicial craftsmanship in
failing to apply the literal wording of a statute when to do so
would accomplish an unjust result never intended by any legislature. In Mooney v. American Automobile Ins. Co.59 the issue
was whether a motorist was contributorily negligent for passing
to the right of another vehicle going in the same direction on a
four-lane highway. The overtaken vehicle veered to its own
right and collided with the plaintiff. The plaintiff was charged
with contributory negligence because the passing provision of
the highway regulatory act then in effect stated that an overtaking vehicle was to pass "to the left" of an overtaken vehicle60
Although under its express wording the statute seemed to
prohibit passing to the right on any state highway, our court
held that the enactment did not apply to four-lane highways
(such as that on which the 1953 accident had occurred), but
only to the two-lane highways in existence at the time the
statutory provision was adopted in 1938. The organ of our court
who recommended the opinion's adoption was Judge Robert Ellis
of the First Circuit, in my opinion a great and imaginative judge.
Judge Ellis pointed out that to apply this 1938 provision forbidding passing on the right to the four- and eight-lane highways
of the Nineteen Fifties could greatly impair the usefulness of
these arteries designed to transport heavy traffic volume quickly
-a slow-moving vehicle in the inside, or left, lane, for instance,
could stop traffic in all other lanes proceeding in the same direction if the slow vehicle slowed and stopped for a left turn. In
the Mooney case, therefore, the passing motorist was held free
of negligence in passing, despite his violation of the literal prohibition of the statute forbidding any passing on the right.
59. 81 So.2d 625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
60. LA. R.S. 32:233A (1950).
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This illustration of judicial discrimination as to whether
or not to apply a statute-by deciding that a statutory rule had
been limited or modified through the changed circumstances of
another day - is not advanced to suggest that all legislation
should be deemed valid for its own decade only, nor that the
courts should ignore the express command of statutory words
just because the social conditions change. Usually, an express
statutory provision is designed to and does regulate not only
present day conditions but also the societal conditions of the
indefinite future, until the legislature itself may repeal it, so
that the courts cannot ignore the statute's express command.
Nevertheless, the Mooney case may illustrate the all-important
principle that the function of the courts is to enforce the legislative purpose, not mechanically to apply printed words because
they are in a statute book. Mooney's limitation of an obsolescent statute's effect to its intended legislative purpose may also
serve to illustrate the function of the courts to adapt both legislative and judge-made law to changing conditions of society, so
that the law-rules may continue to serve their functional purpose. Just as out-of-date cases may be reinterpreted to accord
with a changed social context, so may the word-rule expressed
by an out-of-date statute be reinterpreted and limited so as to
conform to its original functional intent.
VIII
These remarks have touched upon a few of the more obvious aspects of the law-making function of our courts. The specific illustrations from the work of Louisiana state appellate
courts are designed to illustrate that usual and routine performance of this function is a necessary and traditional part of the
judicial duty to decide cases fairly and according to law.
However, our concentration upon the law-making responsibility of the courts does have the demerit of overemphasizing
its importance as a factor which influences our society. In the
first place, clear provisions of statutory law, unquestionably
applied and obeyed, undoubtedly represent the customary form
of governmental direction, without any intervention of the
courts. Likewise, great areas of our social and economic life are
affected by the interpretations and applications of executive
departments and administrative agencies, usually obeyed as
valid regulation without questioning in or by the courts. As
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Cardozo remarked, "unnumbered human beings ... go from
birth to death,... and not once do they appeal to judges to
mark the boundaries between right and wrong."61 In the full
picture of the division of the policy-deciding function among the
organs of government, law-making by the courts plays a small
role indeed.
IX
I will conclude with the realization that a comprehensive
and more rounded discussion of judicial law-making should
include many other aspects of the subject.
I have not discussed, for instance, the inherent institutional
and political limitations to law-making by courts, nor touched
on appropriate standards for the exercise of their undoubted
power to overrule their prior decisions where current needs
greatly outweigh the valued stability of legal precept.a6 I have
not noted the stabilizing influence of doctrine, 68 which generally
64
I
confines judicial law-making to incremental changes only.
have not referred to responsible views suggesting that judicial
self-restraint in law-making is especially appropriate with regard
to issues of pronounced change in public policy that should
preferably be decided by the legislature. 65 Neither have I mentioned the view that the courts should to some extent disguise
exercise of their undoubted law-making so as not to weaken
the popular half-myth that judges only interpret and do not
create law, 66 nor the opposing argument that the law's selfrespect and the democratic ideal demand that there be open
responsibility for the exercise of discretionary power by officials
of the people.6 7
61. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 130 (1921).
62. Id. at 112-14, 146-66; LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); SCHAEFFER, PRECEDENT AND POLICY (1956); Friedmann, Legal
Philisophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 821 (1961).
63. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. Rzv.
463 (1962).
64. Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Inorementalism or Stare Decisis?, 2 L. IN TRANS. Q. 134 (1965).
65. Bennett & Quade, The Court as a Legislator: A Crucial Symptom, 10

ST. Louis U.L.J. 92 (1965); Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 749
(1965); McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of JudicialPolicyMaking, 39 MINN. L. REV. 837 (1955).
66. Mishkin, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62-70 (1965).
67. See, e.g., Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law:Prospective

Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 237 (1965).
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X
A comprehensive discussion of the question should also
include discussion of the practical reasons why the legislature
shares law-making responsibility with the court for the development and reform of law.68 The schedule of a normal legis-

lative session is harried and crowded. The state legislators are
usually part-time public servants, underpaid for the substantial
time they must devote to the governmental and private interests
of their constituents. Most legislative sessions take place within
a period limited in time. Not only must many legislative bills
be considered, but during the same crowded time the legislator
must attend to constituent-errands and to at least some of the
duties of his regular occupation. In Louisiana, for instance, in
the last three regular sessions of 1962, 1964, and 1966, at each
session over 1,500 bills were introduced and well over 500 laws
were enacted 6 9-all during the harried period of 60 days, during
which of necessity the legislative preoccupation must be directed
more to issues of public policy, state taxation, and economic regulation than to minor reforms of private law.
With some understanding of this actual legislative milieu,
the unreality of the charge of judicial usurpation made by critics
of creative court law-making becomes apparent. The legislature
makes little effort to correlate present enactments within the
entire body of the law. For one reason, it has no time to do so.
For another, it fully expects and relies upon the courts to perform their historic mission of synthesizing and harmonizing the
fragments of piecemeal legislation into the mosaic of the general body of the law. The law-making function of the court is
68. Breitel, The Courts and Law Making, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY
1 (Paulsen ed. 1959); Peck, The Role of the Courts and the
Legislature in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963). See also
Friendly, The Gap in Law Making-Judges Who Can't and Legislatures Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963).
69. By letter of March 29, 1967, to the writer (a copy of which is on file
with the Louisiana Law Review), Honorable Wade 0. Martin, Jr., Secretary
of State of Louisiana, furnished the following statistics from the records of
his office concerning the regular legislative sessions of 1962, 1964, and 1966:
AND TOMORROW

Bills Introduced were as follows:
196
1968
House
House
1,278
Senate
306
Senate
Bills enacted were as follows:
1962
549

1964
565

1,251
406

1966
House
Senate

1,202
345

1966
577
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cooperative with the legislature, complementary to its work;
the courts are not in any sense a competitive law-making institution. Understanding the legislative process in its actual environment, it is unrealistic to attribute to legislative inaction any
approval of the multitudinous facets of the law as they exist
prior to judicial decision: the inaction much more often stems
from a lack of time for detail-changing or from the clogging of
the legislative process through pressures requiring priority
attention.
With the consent of the legislatures, the American courts
have always exercised the responsibility to revise and accommodate private law where needed to adjust it to the legal and social
environments of the times. To defer their performance of this
duty on the sole excuse that the legislature alone is charged
with law-change and will do so if dissatisfied with the law as
it is, is an unrealistic excuse for shirking this traditional duty
of the judiciary; it is also an historically unsound view of the
separation of powers. Further, the judicial exercise of this lawrevision responsibility is subject to oversight and review by the
legislature (save perhaps where constitutional questions are concerned). If dissatisfied with any court-made law-change, the
legislature can assert its primacy and can overrule or modify
the judicial decision by statute - and, as studies have illustrated,70 the legislatures have done just that when displeased
with judicial innovations or interpretations in the law.
XI
In a day when there is an outcry against judicial legislation by many sincere elements of our population, as well as by
some irresponsible extremists, it is important for us to recognize
and restate the obvious truth that the courts do possess and
should exercise law-making responsibilities.
By frank recognition that judicial creativity is an essential
component of the process of deciding cases, we may perhaps find
courage to correct the misinformation on the subject of many
of the lay public. Misled by Francis Bacon's half-truth, "Judges
ought to remember that their office is ...to interpret law, and
70. Stempf, Congress4onal Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The
Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965); Comment, DUKu
L.J. 888 (1964).
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not to make law."' 1 and by several generations of oversimplifying high school civics teachers, multitudes of our citizenry have
come to believe that it is somehow improper for judges to admit
to law-innovation, law-choice, or law-revision. Unjust criticism
by the lay public and trust-eroding cynicism may perhaps best
be healed by open recognition that the courts do perform, and
always have, a day-to-day law-adaptation function as a necessary part of their traditional decisional process.
In deference to prevalent if erroneous sentiments, conscientious and sincere judges may question their own law-making
power. Historically, however, the circumscribed law-making
functions normal to the judicial branch have been considered a
supplement to, not an invasion of, the legislature's work. Our
judges must not shirk the hard choice of values sometimes
imposed upon them by their duty to maintain the law's regularity and order and sense by creative revision and adjustment
within the limited area where appropriate. If the courts will not
perform this duty, the legislatures cannot-and the reasoned
development of the law and its ability to serve current needs
must suffer.
71. BACON'S

ESSAYS,

the essay Of Judicature.
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APPELLATE JUDGES AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES:
JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OR MERE COINCIDENCE?
GeraldR. Ferrera*& Mystica Alexander**
"The kind of inquiry that would contribute most to understanding and
discussionfirst, of the nominee's broad
evaluating a judicial] nomination is...
judicial philosophy and, second, of her views on particular constitutional
issues. "/

Elena Kagan, Supreme Court Justice
I. INTRODUCTION
She is much too liberal, too conservative, a judicial activist, a strict
constructionist: all are characterizations used to explain and discover a judge's
judicial philosophy, an endeavor discussed above by now-Supreme Court
Justice Elena Kagan. A judge's opinions often serve as fodder for court
observers and commentators as they attempt to cull a general picture of the
judge's constitutional values from the text. Underpinning this process are
various philosophical theories adopted by judges that contribute to their
judicial beliefs.
This paper suggests that judicial opinions often reflect ajudge's position on
what is ethical and useful in the real world of constitutional values. It further
suggests that an appreciation of legal philosophical theory assists one in
understanding the ethical and public policy dimensions of a court's opinion.
Do judges' opinions parallel philosophical theories constructed by

Gregory H. Adamian Professor of Law, Bentley University, Waltham, MA.
Senior Lecturer of Law, Bentley University, Waltham, MA. The authors acknowledge and thank Jonathan
J. Darrow, Senior Research Consultant, and Anirudh Goyal, Research Assistant, for their efforts and
assistance in preparing this paper.
1. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and Neiw, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 935 (1995) (reviewing
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1995)).
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philosophers or is any apparent relationship mere coincidence? This paper
2
suggests the former-that a judge's belief system, education, and experiences
include the adoption of judicial philosophies, the expression of which can be
found in his or her written opinions.
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis observed that "[p]olitical, social,
and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common
law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society." 3 Justice
Brandeis was right to recognize the "eternal youth" of the common law as it
evolves to satisfy societal needs. Judicial philosophy often embraces an
ethical and social dimension in its analysis, representative of the law's "eternal
youth." To better understand a judge's judicial philosophy it is useful to
appreciate how appellate judges often construct legal arguments by following
a legal philosophical theory. The purpose of investigating a judge's judicial
philosophy is not necessarily to focus on one theory as it applies to the
resolution of a legal dispute, but rather to contextualize the influence of theory
as it exists on a continuum of both past and future development.
This paper introduces theories of justice created by prominent
philosophers and explains how they relate to jurisprudential analysis. It
further argues that the process of understanding legal analysis should
include an appreciation of the ethical theories that underlie the judicial
resolution of legal issues. Ronald Dworkin reminds us that "[l]awsuits matter
in another way that cannot be measured in money or even liberty. There is
inevitably a moral dimension to an action at law, and so a standing risk of a
distinct form of public injustice." 4 This proposition is useful to the study of
resolutions to a legal dispute. The "moral dimension" of a case relevant to this
judicial analysis is best explored by extrapolating any salient "ethical
dilemmas" from the facts of the case.
How does one identify ethical dilemmas? While there are a number of
useful methods, one of the more common is "stakeholder analysis."
Stakeholder analysis starts with an examination of the parties affected by the
decision in the case. For example, if the case involves corporate entities,
"stakeholders" would include the employees, suppliers, stockholders,
customers, lender banks, corporate boards and executives, and any other

2. James Barron, A Neuw York Bloc on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at Al (noting
that if Elena Kagan were confirmed the court would, for the first time in its history, contain four judges
born in New York City).
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (1986) (emphasis added).
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communities affected by the corporation's operation. If the stakeholders are
unjustly deprived of moral or legal rights there is an "ethical dilemma" to be
resolved by the courts.
A. Resolution of an Ethical Dilemma
Once critics of judicial philosophy discover these ethical dilemmas they
should attempt to resolve them. This is a significant challenge since often
stakeholders may have to endure giving up rights for the common good. This
tension is exemplified in cases that examine eminent domain, a government
taking of private property with 'just compensation."5 The private property
owner may be convinced the taking was unjust and the compensation
inadequate. So it is important to recognize the impossibility of a decision
equitable to all stakeholders.
A number of prominent ethicists have created various methods and ethical
theories that are useful in discussing and resolving judicial disputes. The
ancient Greeks, philosophers of the Enlightenment, and contemporary
philosophers have all written about ethical theories. The selected theories
discussed in this paper are selected from among many, with no attempt to
exhaust the field. 6 The paper discusses how such theories apply to an
understanding of our jurisprudence and provides a better appreciation of a
judge's judicial philosophy. It is important to note that a judge may utilize
many judicial philosophies in deciding a case and, depending on the nature of
a dispute, adopt various philosophical theories in developing his or her legal
argument.
Legal scholars should be acquainted with the predominant philosophers
who have formulated the moral and ethical foundations of our contemporary
judicial thinking. Legal scholars and judges who continue to influence our
jurisprudence and public policy should understand the relationship of law to
moral and ethical reasoning.
B. Is PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY RELEVANT TO OUR JURISPRUDENCE?

Since appellate court cases decide litigants' rights and obligations, it is
informative to understand the courts' substantive findings, including the moral
and ethical underpinnings of a judge's reasoning. The legal academy
generally avoids this process, content with an explanation of substantive and
procedural analysis. If the academy argues and debates contemporary legal

5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
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issues without an appreciation of the philosophy that supports the courts'
rationales, it will be difficult to fully recognize and understand the
jurisprudential theory that shapes the legal landscape.
Critics of contemporary court decisions should understand and relate to
ethical theory found in natural law, legal positivism, utilitarianism, legal
realism, and social relativism. This process has been referred to as "ethical
legalism ' 7 and should be useful in understanding the relationship between law
and ethics. What theories of justice are currently forming our contemporary
notions of due process, equal protection, and equal opportunity?
Jurisprudential analysis should engage in a resolution of that inquiry using
deontological and teleological ethical theories used in court decisions.
This paper selects for discussion classical and contemporary philosophers
and legal scholars who have contributed to current judicial thinking. There are
others whose theories have made significant contributions to jurisprudence
that are not mentioned in the text. The selection is based on those
philosophers and scholars most often discussed in contemporary legal
literature. Part II introduces prominent philosophers who have added to our
jurisprudence. A more exhaustive review of their philosophy is beyond the
scope of this paper and is available in copious encyclopedic works. Part III
applies the theories discussed to a recent reverse discrimination Supreme
Court case 8 that illustrates how judges follow a particular judicial philosophy.
This paper argues that judges often referred to by jurisprudential labels are
following ethical theories inherent in their thought processes that contribute to
their jurisprudential analysis. Part IV argues that an understanding of legal
philosophical theory is necessary to identify a judge's judicial philosophy and
should be useful in clarifying the oversimplification and often misleading
characterization of a judge as being either liberal or conservative.
Furthermore, it asserts that an understanding of how a court adopts a legal
philosophy in deciding a case is useful in appreciating the moral and ethical
dimensions of a decision.

7. Gerald R. Ferrera, Ethics in Legal Education: An Augmentation of Legal Realism, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 39,
52 53 (1991).
8. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).

Page 66 of 93

2011]

JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OR MERE COINCIDENCE?

II. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF LAW
A. NATURAL LAW - Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274)
Natural law first appears in Cicero's explanation of the Greek Stoic
philosophers who emphasized virtue, morals and ethics 9 as appropriate
guiding principles of behavior. Starting with Homer, Greek philosophers
developed their theory of natural law in an attempt to explain the human
conditions that are subject to nature's laws. 10 The Greek philosophers
deferred to the cosmic order of things and reconciled "fate" as following the
laws of nature and order in the universe.II
From the Romans, who adopted the Greek culture, up to the time of
Thomas Aquinas, there existed various theories of the Greek version of natural
law.' 2 However, Aquinas, in his Summa Theologiae, developed natural law as
God's guiding Providence, establishing God as the center of all order.' 3
Aquinas argued:
Among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in the
most excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a share of providence, being
provident both for itself and for others. Thus it has a share of the Eternal
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law. 14

In order to best appreciate Aquinas's theory of natural law one should start
with his understanding of human nature. In Question 75 in the Summa he
states: "We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin." 5
He refers to Dionysius, who stated that "three things are to be found in
spiritual substances - essence, power, and operation.... '1 6 Aquinas argues the
soul is "the form of a body."' His position is that "the nature of the species
belongs [to] what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition

9. See LLOYD L. WE1NREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 39-40 (1987) (presenting an analysis of legal

positivism and natural law).
10. See ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 228-29 (3d ed. 2007).

11. Roscoe Pound, Lau, and Morals, I J. Soc. FORCES 350, 351 (1923) ("All discussion of... the relation of
jurisprudence to ethics, goes back to the Greek thinkers .... ").
12. See generally Edward J. Damich, The Essence of Laut, According to Thomas Aquinas, 30 AM. J. JURIS.
79, 79 (1985) (arguing that for Aquinas an unjust law may have some legal attributes but does not have all the
definitional elements and is not really a law).
13. Patrick Halligan, The EnvironmentalPolicy ofSaint Thomas Aquinas, 19 ENVTL. L. 767 (1989) (arguing
that Aquinas would not have given nonhuman creatures juridical standing to sue).
14. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 997 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1915)

(1274).
15. Id. at pt. 1, q. 75.
16. Id.
17. Id. at pt. I, q. 75, art. 5.
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does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter."1 8 His treatise on
natural law is found in the Summa, Questions 90 to 108. Aquinas begins with
a definition of law as "a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to
act or is restrained from acting... the rule and measure of human acts is the
reason, which is the first principle of human acts.. .law is something pertaining
to reason." 1 9 A principal contribution of Aquinas's theory on natural law is its
reference to reason and the common good. 20 From Aquinas's theological
perspective he views man as a composition of body and soul capable of
sensorial perceptions and argues that natural law was discernible by all.2'
Reason, assisted by Revelation, became the human expression of God's
eternal law. Aquinas states that "[tihe natural law is promulgated by the very
fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him
'22
naturally.
The Catholic Church continues to adopt Aquinas's natural law as its
philosophical doctrine. 23 However, apart from its theological foundation in
Catholic doctrine, natural law after Aquinas began to decline.24
The
Enlightenment philosophers - Hobbes, 25 Locke, 26 Rousseau 27 and Kant 28
all made references to natural law, although within different constructs, as

18. Id. at pt. I, q. 7 5, art. 4.
19. Id. atpt. 1-11, q. 90, art. 1.
20. Id. at pt. 1-11, q. 90, art. 3 ("A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the
common good.").
21. See SAMUEL WELLS & BEN QUASH, INTRODUCING CHRISTIAN ETHICS 91 (2010)
22. Id. at pt. 1-11, q. 90, art. 4.
23. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 71 (Vatican trans., St. Paul Books & Media 1993)
(explaining the foundations of Catholic moral theology and asserting "the immutability of the natural law
itself, and thus the existence of 'objective norms of morality'").
24. Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of NaturalLaw Jurisprudence,24 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 539, 559 (1989) ("Application ofthe natural law is not limited to those who accept Catholic teaching.").
25. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (Penguin Books 1968) (1651) (expressing the sentiment that
natural law can be known through reason and that the individual has a natural right to preserve his or her
own life). For a further explanation of Hobbes' view of natural law, see NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS
HOBBES AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION (Daniela Gobeth trans., 1993); see also John Gahbauer,
Natural Law Theory Through the Eyes of Hobbes, Grotius and Pqfendorf, 2 EUDAIMONIA: GEO. PHIL.
REV. 38, 39 (2005) (concluding that "there is little concordance as to what constitutes the naturallaw").
26. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 264 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts
Press 1952) (1690) (The law of nature "willeth [sic] the peace and preservation of all mankind."). For
an analysis of Locke's view of natural law, see Steven Forde, Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in
Locke, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 396 (2001) (exploring Locke's position that morality is grounded in natural
law).
27. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 9 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762) ("[R]enunciation [of liberty] is incompatible with man's nature.").
28. See, e.g., Jerome B. Schneewind, Kant and NaturalLaw Ethics, 104 ETHICS 53 (1993) (explaining the
relationship between Kant's moral philosophy and natural law interpretation of morality).
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promulgations of the natural order. Contemporary defenders of natural law,
within a jurisprudential context, view it as an assertion that "law is a part of
ethics.

'29

Indeed, natural law principles are used to infuse ethical concepts into legal
analysis) 0 The Greeks and Romans used natural law as an objective standard
31
that measured civil laws. What are the objective ethical standards ofjustice?
Consider the following objective legal standards of our common law such as
"due care" in a negligence suit, "good faith" in a contracts claim, "reasonable
care," "due process of law" and "equality" that all have their origin in natural
law theory. It is of interest to note that the Framers of the United States
Constitution did not define many of our cherished notions of equality, due
process and freedom of speech. A natural law proponent would argue they are
inherent in our reasoning process based on our natural desire forjustice.
Roscoe Pound, in his Introduction to the Philosophy ofLaw stated:
It was not that natural law expressed the nature of man [.] [Here he differs from
Aquinas.] [R]ather it expressed the nature of government. One form of this
variant was due to our doctrine that the common law of England was in force
only so far as applicable to our conditions and our institutions. The attempt to
put this doctrine philosophically regards an ideal form of the received common
law as natural law and takes natural law to be a body of deductions from or
32
implications of American institutions or the nature of our polity.

One could argue the common law has incorporated natural law principles such
as "good faith" in a contract, "due care" and "reasonable care" in a negligence
suit, and the notion that individuals are protected by the Bill of Rights.
John Finnis, 33 in his Natural Law and Natural Rights, argues that positive
34
laws ought to conform to objective normative principles of natural law.
Finnis suggests that we are led to an understanding of the objective normative

29. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxtord Univ. Press 1980) (describing natural

rights as having their foundation in natural law).
30. David 0. Brink, Legal Positivism and Natural Law Reconsidered Again, 2 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 171
(1989) (suggesting that "we should distinguish, within legal philosophy, between theories of legal validity...
and theories of adjudication.
); Igor Grazin, NaturalLau, as a Forum of Legal Studies, 37 AM. J. JURIS. I
(1992); Patrick Halligan, The EnvironmentalPolicy ofSaint Thomas Aquinas, 19 ENVTL. L. 767 (1989).
31. R. George Wright, Legal Obligation and the Natural Lair, 23 GA. L. REv. 997, 1011 (1989) ("What
humans ought to do, what they are morally bound to do, flows from their distinctive nature."); Rice, supra
note 24, at 559.
32. ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 50 (Yale Univ. Press 1922).
33. See JOHN FrNNTS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). For a critique of Finnis, see Anthony

J. Lisska, Finnis and Veatch on Natural Law in Aristotle and Aquinas, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 55 (1991) (critiquing
Finnis's natural law ethics); Valerie Kerruish, PhilosophicalRetreat: A Criticism of John Finnis' Theory of
Natural Law, 15 U. W. AUSTRALIA L. REV. 224 (1983); Ian Duncanson, Finnisand the Politics of Natural
Law, 19 U. W. AUSTRALIA L. REv. 239 (1989).
34. See Lisska, supra note 33, at 60-61.
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principles not by rigorous differential analysis but rather by "careful reflection,
or meditation, directly to an awareness of self-evident, indemonstrable
truths.1 35 Finnis and Aquinas regard the principles of natural law as selfevident. Lloyd L. Weinreb, in his NaturalLaw & Justice, agrees but finds that
Finnis's "extract[ion] of Aquinas's doctrine of natural law from its context and
treat[ment] [of] it as separable from the idea of a universal order according to
the Eternal Law of God not only radically distorts Aquinas's philosophy as a
whole but misconceives the doctrine of natural law itself."36 He explains that
deontologically there is an argument that "[flaw's very nature... impresses on
it a minimum moral content."'37 Whatever that "minimum moral content"
might be determines the natural law advocates' position that unjust laws need
38
not be obeyed.
It is important to note that one need not have a religious belief to be a
natural law proponent.3 9 Robert George, another contemporary proponent of
the natural law, posed the following question during a scholarly lecture:
"[C]an natural law... provide the basis for a regime of human rights law
without consensus on the existence and nature of God and the role of God in
human affairs?" 40 In response, George goes on to say: "In my view, anybody
who acknowledges the human capacities for reason and freedom has good
41
grounds for affirming human dignity and basic human rights."
The critical doctrine of natural law is the principle that our positive law
must comply with objective standards of fundamental rights that assure
equality for all. Humankind has an absolute dignity that natural law
recognizes and protects.
Indeed, in his Letter from Birmingham Jail,
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. invoked the natural law:
How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man

made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is
a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St.
Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law
and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that
42
degrades human personality is unjust.

35. WELNREB, supra note 9, at 109.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, The CaseforNatural Lau, Reexamined, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1993); Jerome
B. Schneewind, Kant and Natural Lam, Ethics, 104 ETHIcS 53 (1993); R. George Wright, Legal Obligation
and the NaturalLai, 23 GA. L. REV. 997 (1989).
40. Robert George, NaturalLair, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 182 (2008).
41. Id.

42.

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL

(Apr. 16, 1963), reprinted in 26 U.C.

DAVIS L. REV. 835, 840 (1993).
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We see natural law sentiments invoked in judicial decisions as well. The
ruling that privacy is a fundamental implied constitutional right found in the
Ninth Amendment is an example of a natural law theory.4 3 More recently, the
Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago upheld the right to bear arms as a
fundamental right "necessary to our system of ordered liberty. '44 Responding
to Justice Breyer's concern in his dissenting opinion that applying this right to
state and local gun control laws would necessarily limit the "legislative
freedom of the State," 45 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, reiterated the
Court's earlier pronouncement that 'the enshrinement of constitutional rights
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.' ' 46 It is of interest to
recognize the use of natural law principles by both a reputedly liberal Justice
(Breyer) and a reputedly conservative Justice (Alito). Concepts of "freedom"
and "the enshrinement of constitutional rights" are inherently reasonable
47
theories necessary for ajust society.
B. LEGAL POSITIVISM - John Austin (1790-1854)

"The matter ofjurisprudence is positive law.

"48

- John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence
John Austin, the founder of legal positivism, was the Chair of Jurisprudence
at the University College London. 49 During his tenure as Chair, Austin
published his lectures under the title of The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined. Austin's theory of legal positivism is useful in critical legal
thinking as a reminder that law is not wholly dependant on a system of
morality, but rather on a combination of utilitarian rights, duties, and
obligations.50 However, Austin does not deny that law can be analyzed from a
moral perspective. In fact, Austin stressed just the opposite and insisted that
51
law has a moral perspective.

43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
44. 130 S. Ct 3020, 3042 (2010).
45. Id. at 3050.
46. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)).
47. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)).
48. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 88 (Robert Campbell ed., 3d ed. 1869).
49. See Stanley L. Paulson, The Theory of Public Law in Germany 1914-1945, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 525, 525 (2005).
50. Luke Robinson, Moral Principles Are Not Moral Lawvs, 2 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 3 (2008); Margot
Stubbs, Feminism andLegalPositivism, 3 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & Soc'Y 63 (1986).
51. See DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 7 (1984); Carlos Santiago Nino, Positivism and

Communitarianism:Between Human Rights and Democracy, 7 RATIO JURIS 14 (1994); Deryck Beyleveld &
Roger Brownsword, The PracticalDifference Between NaturalLaw Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985); H. Hamner Hill, H.L.A. Hart's Hermeneutic Positivism: On Some Methodological
Dificulties in the Concept ofLaiw, 3 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 113 (1990).
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Austin divided the laws that guide human behavior into (1) divine law, (2)
positive law and (3) positive morality. 52 Divine law would include Revealed

Law established by God. 53 Positive law is created by the sovereign of a
community, such as a legislative body. 54 Positive morality would include
positive laws and contemporary attitudes. 55 Positive law is judged to be moral
or immoral depending on how it serves the welfare of others. 56 Austin admits
57
to an objective morality founded in a theological conception of Divine Law.
He believed that all laws are coercive commands that must serve the general
welfare. According to Roscoe Pound, Austin defines a right as "a 'faculty'
residing in a determinate person by virtue of a given rule of law which avails
'58
against and answers to a duty lying on some other person.
H. L. A. Hart formulated in his The Concept of Law the most widely
accepted theory of Austin's positive law.59 Hart views law as social facts

60
formed by individuals who internalize a standard and thereby create a rule.
Hart believes that moral obligations are determined by socially accepted
rules. 61 Hart makes a distinction between primary and secondary rules
wherein the former create rights and duties, while the latter establish how and
by whom primary rules may be enacted, amended or extinguished. 62 Both

Austin and Hart view law as a social phenomenon subject to empirical
analysis. 63 Writing for the majority in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, Justice Kennedy ruled that "[t]here is simply no support for the

52.
53.
54.
55.

2 JoHN AUSTIN, supra note 48, at 175-76.
Id. at 294
Id. at 337
Hill, supra note 51, at 115 (arguing "that moderate externalism cannot bear the weight that Hart places

upon it"); David Dyzenhaus, Why Positivism is Authoritarian,37 Am. J. JuRts. 83 (1992).
56. Hill, supranote 51, at X.

57. 2 JoN AUSTIN, supranote 48, at 175-76.
58. Roscoe Pound, Fiy Years of Jurisprudence,50 HARV. L. REV. 557, 571 (1937); see also LYONS, supra

note 51, at7.
59. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); see also TE

AUTONOMY OF THE LAW, ESSAYS ON LEGAL

POSITIVISM (Robert George ed., 1999) (exploring the current state of legal positivism in a series of essays
written by leading contemporary philosophers of the law); LYONS, supra note 51, at 51; Rosina L. Hunt,
NaturalLan, v. Positive Lan,: InterpretingMorality, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 231 (1993).
60. William C. Starr, Laiw and Morality in HL.A. Hart's Legal Philosophy, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 682

(1984) ("Hart holds that law is an instrument of social control."); Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the
LegalProcess Tradition: The Legacy of Hartand Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987).
61. See Starr, supra note 60, at 681.
62. Wellman, supra note 60, at 474 ("Dworkin's kinship with Hart... implies that the Legal Process

tradition is more vital than has commonly been supposed.").
63. See generally David Dyzenhaus, Why Positivism is Authoritarian,37 AM. J. JURIS. 83 (1992) (arguing

that contemporary positivists collaborate in an authoritarian political project); Deryck Beyleveld & Roger
Brownsword, The PracticalDifference Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OXFORD J.

LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1985) ("Revelation, Austin holds, is an incomplete guide to the will of God, utility is no
index of it, and appeals to conscience are a cloak for superstition and ignorance."); Margot Stubbs, Feminism

andLegal Positivism,3 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & Soc'Y 63 (1986); Pound, supranote 58.

Page 72 of 93

2011]

JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OR MERE COINCIDENCE?

view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the
suppression of political speech by media corporations." 64 Quoting from the
dissent in UnitedStates v. Automobile Workers, Justice Kennedy states:
Under our Constitution it is We The People who are sovereign. The people
have the final say. The legislators are their spokesmen. The people determine
through their votes the destiny of the nation. It is therefore important-vitally
important-that all channels of communications be open to them during every
election, that no point of view be restrained or barred,65and that the people have
access to the views of every group in the community.
Hart's version of positive law would argue that we have a moral obligation
based on the Constitution to include all political points of view in the election
process.
C. UTILITARIANISM -

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

"[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, againsthis will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient

warrant."66
-

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty

John Stuart Mill was one of the most influential philosophers in England
during the nineteenth century. 67 Mill was an empiricist and would accept and
believe a proposition only if it could be experienced. 68 One could trace the
logic of the American legal realism movement to his theory of utilitarianism.
Ronald Dworkin, in his text Taking Rights Seriously, states that Mill "deploys
a pessimistic theory of human nature, emphasizes the value of cultural and
historical constraints on egotism, and insists on the role of the state in
educating its citizens away from individual appetites and toward social
conscience." 69 David Lyons, in his text Ethics and the Rule of Law, argues
that Mill attempted to reconcile moral rights as the principle of justice on
utilitarian grounds. 70 Professor Lyons states "the idea that people have natural
rights can be understood apart from dubious ideas about 'self-evidence.'... [A
moral right is one] that does not depend for its existence (as some legal rights

64. 130 S. C. 876, 906 (2010).
65. Id. at 901 (quoting U.S. v. Int'l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).

66.

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY

67. Fred Wilson,

6 (Longmans, Green, &Co. 1913).

STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,

John Stuart Mill (Edward N. Zalta ed.,

2009), availableat http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/.
68. See id.

69.
70.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

LYONS, supranote 51,

260 (1978).

at 128.
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seem to do) on some sort of social recognition or enforcement." 71 Utilitarian
ethics, according to Mill, establish principles of justice as "moral rules, which
concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of
'72
more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life."
Holly Smith Goldman asserts that utilitarianism
identifies effects on human welfare as the criterion to use in assessing social
phenomena... [and] presents us with a single rule which covers all decisionmaking... [and] promises to provide us with a precise formula for making
decisions... by a process of calculating the effect on human welfare which is
relatively invulnerable to the whims and biases of all-too-human decision
73
makers.

This "single rule" is the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the
greatest number, which contemplates a grand scheme of benevolence and
seeks out the greater happiness of the stakeholders. 74 Utilitarianism may be
analyzed by dividing its theory into two principles: act-utilitarianism and ruleutilitarianism.
7
Act-utilitarianism considers the net happiness for all the stakeholders. 1 It
has been criticized as an ethical theory that may justify violating a person's
rights for the long-range benefit and happiness of society. 76 Act-utilitarianism
is a teleological ethical theory that is more concerned with the consequences
of the act on society, than with the morality of the act itself.77 An example of
this is section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which grants federal
immunity from liability to a provider of an interactive web site for content
posted by an outsider. 78 The Supreme Court took a utilitarian approach in
United States v. American Library Ass'n, holding that federal legislation
requiring libraries to utilize Internet filtering software as a prerequisite to
79
receiving federal funding did not violate patrons' First Amendment rights.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the government has
broad discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding what private

71. See id; see also Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A UtilitarianApproach to Contract Laiw
Remedies, 56 UCLA L. REV. 59, 126 (2008) ("[T]he utilitarian approach helps reconcile consequentialism
and nonconsequentialism within contract law by maximizing efficiency through the mechanism of promise
keeping.").
72. JOHN STUART MELL, UTILITARIANISM 75 (Forgotten Books 2008).
73. Holly Smith Goldman, Raivls and Utilitarianism,in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION 346-47 (Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith eds., 1980).
74. See id. at 346.
75. See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ethics, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/ (last visited Mar.
232011).
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2011).
79. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2002) (plurality opinion).
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speech to make available to the public." 80 In a decision some say "undermines
the court's landmark ruling in Mirandav. Arizona, which has helped preserve
the constitutional right to remain silent for more than four decades," 81 the
Supreme Court held in Berghuis v. Thompkins "an accused who wants to
invoke his or her right to remain silent [must] do so unambiguously. ' 82 The
Court found that when the defendant responded to a detective's question after
a three hour interrogation during which he primarily remained silent, that
response was a sufficient waiver of his right to remain silent.8 3 Seemingly
adopting a utilitarian approach that focuses on the benefit to society, Justice
Kennedy writing for the majority stated: "A requirement of an unambiguous
invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that 'avoid[s]
difficulties of proof and... provide[s] guidance to officers' on how to proceed
84
in the face of ambiguity."
Rule-utilitarianism relies on case precedent but allows for judicial review
authorizing the overruling of a law that is no longer effective. It is yoked to
tradition and less concerned with subjective personal judgments. 5 Although
not based on the formal principles of Kant's "categorical imperatives," it does
rely on empirical consequences that are often aimed at the long-range benefit
to society. 86 According to both act and rule utilitarianism the good
87
consequences of the act must be the happiness of society for it to be ethical.
D. LEGAL REALISM -

Justice 0. W. Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935)

"The realjustification of a rule of law, if there be one, is that it helps to
bring about a social end which we desire. "88
-

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law

80. Id. at 204.
81. Steven Shapiro, The Thompkins Decision: A Threat to Civil Liberties, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2010, at
A19.

82. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994)).
85. See Andrew R. Strauss, Note, Losing Sight of the UtilitarianForestforthe Retributivist Trees: An
Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOzO L. REV.
1549, 1563-64 (2002).
86. Id. at 1563 (citing Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics, in THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE 3
(1997)); see also infra Part II.E.
87. M. Francis Reeves, Ethical Theories: Tools for Decision Making3l, 38, 40, app. 22 (unpublished notes).
88. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
210, 238 (1920).

Page 75 of 93

574

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

[Vol. XIV:4

Justice Holmes is considered to be the founder of legal realism. 89 Holmes
rejected legal fundamentalism that used the rule of law as an objective
Legal realism is a method of analyzing a
standard of jurisprudence.
transaction and allowing the facts to dictate their own rules rather than
imposing external regulations. 90 William L. Twining of the University argues
that legal realism affected social change and legal reform by appealing to
values that are not found in appellate court decisions or other material
traditionally used in law school education. 91 Karl N. Llewellyn believes that
legal realism was not an ideology or coherent legal philosophy but rather a
method or technique, which could be used by legal scholars regardless of their
philosophy. 92 This notion of legal realism as a method or technique to assist
one in understanding the value orientation of a legal decision is a viable option
to scholars who are concerned with the philosophical implications of
decisional law.93 Roscoe Pound, a legal realist and the founder of sociological
jurisprudence, suggested as early as 1910 that law professors should be
students of sociology, economics and politics to remedy the backwardness of
law in meeting social problems. 94 Current law school curricula follow that
counsel with their many diverse elective courses and legal movements in such
areas as Law & Society, Technology & Law, Law & Economics, Protecting
the Environment, and Feminist Studies.
What eventually emerged from the legal realism movement was a belief
that law is political and involved with social phenomena. 95 One can look to
the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v.EPA to find evidence of

89. See Thomas A. Reed, Holmes and the Paths of the Laii', 37 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 273, 301 (1993) ("To
talk of reasoning from behind 'the veil of ignorance' would have been for Holmes to talk nonsense. People
are social creatures, marked by sex, race, intellectual capacity. To decide without reference to oneself, or to
our culture's place in history, was toHolmes absurd, misguided and arrogant ...").
90. N.E.H. Hull, Some Realism About the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Realism: The Newly Uncovered
Private Correspondence,1927 1931, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 921, 966 (1987).
91. See WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 5 7 (1973).
92. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, TiE COMMON LAW TRADITION DECIDING APPEALS 510 app. B (1960).

93. Bruce W. Brower, DispositionalEthical Realism, 103 ETTCS 221, 222 (1993) ("Dispositional ethical
realism is the view that ethical properties are specified by empirically discoverable, reductive accounts that
treat moral properties as... dependent on evaluators' responses or dispositions to respond.").
94. See Roscoe Pound, Lu,in Books andLo, in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12,35 36(1910).
95. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realismfor Lacyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 524 (1990) ("The truth about
legal realism for lawyers mandates that legal ethics acknowledge the distinction that lawyers have to shape
the.., legal rules ....
Legal ethics owes the profession and society a credible account of how that distinction
should be exercised."); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Realism About the High Court, 18 FED. L. REV. 27, 39
(1988) ("[I]f people are told that the Court has never been, and cannot be, apolitical ... then many will
conclude that 'anything goes'
the only question being whether the judges' politics are tobe 'conservative'
or 'progressive', a question to be settled (as it is now in the United States) at the time of their appointment.");
Allan Ides, Realism, Rationality and Justice Byron White: Three Easy Cases, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv. 283, 283
86; John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, DavidSouter's Bad ConstitutionalHistory, WALL ST.J., June
14, 2010, at A15 ("A judge, [Souter] said, must determine which of the conflicting constitutional values
should become our fundamental law by taking account of new social realities.").
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legal realism. 96 In that case the Court recognized Massachusetts' right to sue
the EPA over the negative impact of global warming on the state. 97 The
Supreme Court determined that The Clean Air Act "authorizes EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event
that it forms a 'judgment' that such emissions contribute to climate
change." 98
Recognizing that "[a] well-documented rise in global
temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere," 99 Justice Stevens concluded that
"[the] EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide
whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action
was therefore 'arbitrary, capricious.., or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 100 The Court's reliance on other disciplines, in this case evidence from
the scientific community, as a means to resolve a legal dispute is a hallmark of
legal realism.
The Court also adopted a legal realist approach in Bilski v. Kappos.'0' In
affirming the patentability of business methods, the Court recognized that
"times change [and] [tiechnology and other innovations progress in
unexpected ways." 10 2
Quoting the Court's decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Court went on to state that "[a] categorical rule denying
patent protection for 'inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress...
would frustrate the purposes of patent law.""' 01 3 The legal realists were
interdisciplinary and their legal casebooks acknowledged the reliance on
history, economics, sociology and psychiatry as relevant to legal education. 104
As technology and business methods continue to co-evolve, courts can be
expected to modify rules of law based on the theory of legal realism, such as
by integrating science with traditional legal syllogism when resolving
disputes.

96. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
97. Id. at 505.
98. Id. at 528.
99. Id. at 504 05 (2007).

100. Id. at 534.
101. See 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).

102. Id. at 3227.
103. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)).
104. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 4 (1986). The guidelines established
for business schools by the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business have adopted a similar
interdisciplinary attitude toward business education.
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E. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES - Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity....
For enlightenment of this kind; all that is needed isfreedom. And the freedom
in question is the most innocuousform of all: freedom to make public use of
one's reason in all matters. "105
- Immanuel Kant, Was istAuJklarung [What is Enlightenment?]
Kant is considered by many authorities as the most prominent philosopher
of his generation, and he wrote extensively about morals and ethics. With
respect to ethics he is best known for his "categorical imperatives."10 6 For
example: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my
maxim should become a universal law."' 17 One could paraphrase that to
mean: What if everyone did what I am about to do? What would be the result
of my conduct on society?
Another of his famous categorical imperatives is: "Act in such a way that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another,
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means."108 This
means that an act should be moral or ethical as an end in itself and not merely
as a means to accomplish an ulterior motive. Kant's moral philosophy is a
deontological theory. 1° 9

One could say that deontology demands that we

follow a duty arising from a contract or a relationship that obligates a certain
course of action. Kant's categorical imperatives are useful in case analyses
based on violated contract or fiduciary relationships. The law of contracts and
torts relies on duties imposed by law, with a Kantian obligation to obey their
dictates. In United States v. Philip Morris USA the DC Circuit affirmed a
district court ruling that leading tobacco companies had committed fraud

105. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?" in KANT: POLITICAL
54 55 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970).
106. See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Kant, http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantmeta (last visited Mar.
23,2011).
107. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (James W. Ellington trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993).
108. Id. at 36.
109. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Deontological
Ethics (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.s nford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/
(noting that:
The word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty (deon) and science (or study) of (logos). In
contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which
choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of
moral theories that guide and assess our choices ofwhat we ought to do (deontic theories)).
WRITINGS
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against the general public for several decades.110 In reaching his conclusion,
District Court Judge Kessler held, in part:
[I]t is absurd to believe that the highly-ranked representatives and agents of
these corporations and entities had no knowledge that their public statements
were false and fraudulent. The Findings of Fact are replete with examples of
C.E.O.s, Vice-Presidents, and Directors of Research and Development, as well
as the Defendants' lawyers, making statements which were inconsistent with
the internal knowledge and practice of the corporation itself.' 11

Judge Kessler's holding adopts Kant's categorical imperative of "truth telling"
expressed as: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will
that my maxim should become a universal law." 112 The record clearly
indicates that the Philip Morris executives violated that imperative.
F. THE ORIGINAL POSITION - John Rawls (1921 - 2002)

"A legal system is a coercive order ofpublic rules addressedto rational
persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the
frameworkfor social cooperation. When these rules arejust they establish
a basis for legitimate expectations. They constitute grounds upon which
persons can rely on one another and rightly object when their expectations
are notfulfilled. "II3

- John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice established a renaissance in political
theory. 1 4 His analysis of justice is useful to a discussion of ethics and how it
applies to contemporary decisional law, and his criticism of our notions of
liberty and equality has been widely discussed in law review literature." 5

110. 566 F.3d 1095, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
111. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1,853 (D.D.C. 2006).
112. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 70 (H.J. Paton ed., HarperCollins 2009)
(1785).
113. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971).
114. See Victoria Meikle, Book Review, 36 MCGILL L. J. 692 (1991) (reviewing C-ANDRAN KUKATHAS &
PI-TILP PETTIT, RAWLS "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" AND ITS CRITICS (1990)) (providing a critique of Rawls'
contractarian argument).
115. See, e.g, Michael P. Zuckert, The New Rav/s and Constitutional Theory: Does It Really Taste That
Much Better?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 227-28 (1994); Rex Martin, Raivls"s New Theory of Justice, 69
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 737 (1994); S. A. Lloyd, Relativizing Rawils, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 709 (1994); Stephen
M. Griffin, Political Philosophy 17ersus Political Theory: The Case of Rais, 69 CH.-KENT L. REV. 691
(1994); Joan A. Pisarchik, A RaivisianAnalysis of the ImmigrationAct of 1990, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 721,
731 (1992) ("[I]mmigrants are generally those who are worst off because they have the fewest social and
economic rights. They are the recipients of unequal treatment and such unequal treatment is allowable in a
Rawlsian framework only if...
the least advantaged members of society benefit.").
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Legal scholars would do well to expose themselves to his ideas as an approach
to understanding our legal system in a new light, one that is especially
sensitive to minority interests.
In A Theory ofJustice, Rawls writes:
During much of modem moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory
has been some form of utilitarianism. One reason for this is that it has been
espoused by a long line of brilliant writers who have built up a body of thought
truly impressive in its scope and refinement.... Those who criticized them...
failed.., to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it ....
What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of
abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract.... The theory that results
is highly Kantian in nature.] 16

Rawls posits relationships between individuals and the community and
develops two principles of justice that he believes would be applied by people
in "the original position" (i.e., a group of people who are unaware of their
17
social status in society and come together to form a social contract).'
He defines the "original position" as a community that would apply
"principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own
interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the
fundamental terms of their association."' 18 Rawls uses the original position as
a hypothetical situation where
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does

anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence, strength and the like. The principles of justice are chosen behind a
veil of ignorance.... Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the
result of a fair agreement or bargain. 119

Rawls argues that two principles of justice would be chosen by those in the
original position. 20 First, the Equal Liberty Principle: "[Ejach person is to
have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others." 12 1 Notice how this differs from a utilitarian position
of "the greater good for the greater number" that necessitates the "lesser
number" will not be granted "equal rights." Many case decisions and
22
legislative laws adopt the utilitarian theory and sacrifice minority interests. 1
116. RAWLS, supra note 113, at vii-viii.

117. Leif Wenar, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, John Rawls (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 12.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 102 122 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Democratic Equality Principle: "[S]ocial and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected
to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
123
open to all."'
Rawls would insist that equality and freedom are the two basic political
principles that must be applied by those who deliberate in the original position
behind a veil of ignorance and establish contractual rules for their public
institutions and individual welfare. Members of his hypothetical group would
not need to reject their personal beliefs and values providing their credence to
a personal philosophy; moral standards or religious beliefs are not imposed on
others. 124 Judicial philosophy that argues for affirmative action would support
a Rawlsian theory. Cases such as Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke125 and Grutter v. Bollinger,1 26 which uphold affirmative action policies
in institutes of higher education, illustrate judicial adoption of Rawls'
philosophical principles of equal liberty and democratic equality.

G. PRiMA FACIE DUTIES -W.D.

Ross (1877-1971)

"Our duty, then, is not to do certain things which will produce certain
results. Our acts, at any rate our acts of special obligation, are not right
because they will produce certain results - which is the view common to
allforms of utilitarianism.1,27
- William David Ross, The Right and the Good
W.D. Ross was a "moral intuitionist" who established prima facie duties
that are generally binding, irrespective of their results, based on a moral
obligation to perform. 128 For instance he stated, "[u]nless stronger moral
obligations override, one ought to keep a promise."1 29 He argues, however,
that it is more important that our duties fit the facts than Kant's absolute
obligation to always tell the truth regardless of the consequences.1 30 Ross
states that in exceptional cases "the consequences of fulfilling a promise...

123. Id.
124. See LYONS, supra note 51, at190.

125. 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (holding that the use of race as a criterion for admission at higher
education institutions is permissible).
126. 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) ("[J]n the context of its
individualized inquiry into the possible diversity
contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly
harm nonminority applicants.").
127. WILLIAM DAVID Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 46 (1930).
128. Jan Garrett, A Simple and Usable (Although Incomplete) Ethical Theory Based on the Ethics of

W.D. Ross, W. KY. UNIV. (Aug. 10, 2004), http://www.wku.edu/-jan.garrett/ethics/rossethc.htm.
129. Id.
130. Ross,supranote 127, at18 19.
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'
would be so disastrous to others that we judge it right not to do so."131
From a legal perspective his "promise keeping" duty is useful in developing
legal arguments based on contractual obligations or implied tortious duties.
Of special interest is his insistence that "[t]he moral order... is just as much
part of the fundamental nature of the universe.., as is the spatial or
132
numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic."
This proposal compels Ross to develop his ethical theory on the basis of
conflicting duties that often create ethical dilemmas that can always be
resolved because one of his prima facie duties has preference over another.
Selecting the most important duty is his way of resolving an ethical
dilemma.

Since our judiciary is often called upon to resolve cases where the facts
create conflicting duties, for instance in employment disparate-treatment
(the employer's implied duty not to engage in intentional discrimination)
and disparate-impact (the employer's implied duty prohibiting unintentional
discrimination), 3 3 it is useful to review Ross's prima facie duties as
obligations implied as promises and observe how our jurisprudence often
1 34
reflects a Rossian ethical theory.
Ross argues that an actual duty is accompanied by a moral duty to
perform and he provides a list of prima facie duties to be used as guidelines
in resolving ethical dilemmas. 135 Courts often apply these duties when
confronted with a dispute, thereby adopting moral obligations into our
jurisprudence.
The first duty, of fidelity, relates to promise keeping that may be
contractual, express or implied, under the circumstances. 36 From a legal
perspective one can trace contractual duties from the contract terms and
conditions and implied duties from a fiduciary relationship 37 or from duties
implied under tort law. Court decisions that discuss duties expressed or
implied in law are following Ross's notion of prima facie duties of fidelity
as obligations to keep and perform promises. Next, the duty of reparation is

131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 29-30.
133. See infra Part 111.
134. Ross, supra note 127, at 46-47.
135. Id.
136. Id. at21.
137. In 1939 the Supreme Court of Delaware in Guth v. Loft ruled that corporate directors owe the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
These fiduciary duties continue to be recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Brewer, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60863, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2010) ("[A]II directors and officers of a corporation owe
their shareholders fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.").
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a duty to compensate for injuries done to others.138 Contract and tort
damages are based on the defendant's duty to compensate the aggrieved
plaintiff for loss resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant.' 3 9 When a court awards punitive damages, it is engaging in
providing compensation to the plaintiff based on the prima facie duty of
reparation for the defendant's egregious harmful conduct. 140 The duty of
gratitude is founded on an obligation when granted a benefit, individual or
social, without cost, and has relevance to a philanthropic undertaking,
including the tax advantages attributable to non-profit corporations. 141 The
non-profit entity, in return for the tax advantage provided by the state, has a
duty to perform a social service to the public. Our common law of
142
negligence is based on the duty of non-malfeasance-not to harm others.
This obligation is resolved by the courts1 43 where a duty to perform carefully
has been unintentionally violated resulting in injury to the defendant.
Duty to prevent harm. One could argue that statutes such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act 144 that prohibit employment discrimination utilize this duty to
prevent harm to the employee. With the duty of beneficence, 145 Ross is
concerned with a duty to enhance the well-being of others. Statutory laws
often follow that precept in an attempt to remedy a social malady. 146 The duty
of self-improvement 147 relates to laws that obligate individuals to help
themselves, such as probation and compulsory driver's education in driving
under the influence cases. Ross's duty of justice 48 makes for an interesting
comparison with Rawls's Equal Liberty Principle. Ross, along with Rawls,
finds a social duty to distribute societal benefits fairly. The federal tax code

138. WILLIAM DAVID Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 289 (Clarendon Press 1949).
139. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-702 (sellers' remedies for breach), 2-711 (buyers' remedies for breach)
(2004).
140. See Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc, 176 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Or. 2008). The Oregon Supreme Court

upheld a $79.5 million award against the cigarette manufacturer.
141. Ross, supra note 127, at 21 27; see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
142. Ross, supra note 127, at 21, 26.
143. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009) (upholding a decision of the Vermont

Supreme Court that allowed a plaintiff to recover from a drug manufacturer for an inadequate warning
label).

144. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
145. Ross, supra note 127, at 21.
146. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2006) (authorizing a tax deduction for medical and dental expenses).
147. Ross, supra note 127, at 21.

148. Id. at 23.
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contains provisions that follow this duty. 149 The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act1 50 is based on a duty to distribute health care to all as a
precept of social justice.
A judge's application of Ross's prima facie duties to a case relates to his or
her subsequent characterization as being liberal or conservative, a judicial
activist or a strict constructionist. Ross provides useful guidelines in analyzing
a case from a philosophical and ethical perspective.

III. PHILOSOPHICAL

THEORY AND

Ricci V. DESTEFAATO

"LearnedHand, who was one ofAmerica's best and mostfamous judges,
said he feared a lawsuit more than death or taxes.... People often stand to
gain or lose more by one judge's nod than they could by any general act of
Congress or Parliament."15 I
-

Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire

In Law ' Empire, Ronald Dworkin sets the stage for the development of
judicial philosophy by indicating the power of the judiciary over the average
person's life. How judges decide cases and use this power involves their
background, personal experience and philosophy. Supreme Court decisions
reflect not only how the institution has functioned throughout American
history but also how jurists think. 52
A. Philosophical Analysis of Ricci v. DeStefano
The facts of the case disclose a New Haven, Connecticut, firefighter exam
used to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions. 153 The results of the exam
indicated that white candidates scored higher than minority candidates, and the
154
City decided to disregard the results based on statistical racial disparity.
White and Hispanic firefighters who passed the exam sued the City when it
refused to certify the test results, alleging that such actions discriminated
against them based on their race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.155

149. One such provision is the Earned Income Tax Credit offered to low to moderate income families to
either offset a tax liability or generate a refund. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2006).
150. Pub. L. No. 111-148,124 Stat. 119 (2010).
151. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 1.
152. Justice Holmes' essay The Path of the Lair, written while he was a member of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, emphasized legal study as the prediction of ajudge's decision. Id. at 461.
153. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
154. Id.
155. Id. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Star. 241 (codified
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The City responded that had it certified the test results it could be accused
156
of adopting a practice having a disparate impact on minority firefighters.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
Second Circuit affirmed.' 5 The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
courts and held that in disregarding the tests results the City intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiffs in violation of Title VII. 158
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito.1 59 Justice Ginsberg filed a
160
Of
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer.
interest is that the so-called conservative block joined Justice Kennedy, and
the liberal block joined Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.
The theories presented above provide insight into the judicial reasoning
employed by the opinion writers in this case. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy expresses the following view of Title VII:
As enacted in 1964, Title Vi's principal nondiscrimination provision held
employers liable only for disparate treatment. That section retains its original
wording today. It makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation. terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 161

The opinion goes on to explain the nature of disparate impact
discrimination. "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include an express
prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact."1 62 The
Court recognized this prohibition in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.1 63 and
Congress later codified it in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.164 "Under the
disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by
showing that an employer uses 'a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
1' 65
national origin.'

as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
156. 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2663.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2672.

162. Id.
163. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
164. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)

(2011)).
165. 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006)).
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Natural law. Recognizing that the Court should interpret statutory law to
give effect to both disparate treatment and disparate impact concerns,
Justice Kennedy stated:
The purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications.

rather than on the basis of race or color. In searching for a standard that strikes
a more appropriate balance, we note that this Court has considered cases
similar to this one, albeit in the context of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has held that certain government actions to
remedy past racial discrimination actions that are themselves based on race
are constitutional only where there is a strong basis in evidence that the
66
remedial actions were necessary. 1

This reference to the Equal Protection Clause in establishing a standard
when disparate-impact and disparate-treatment are in conflict is of interest
when searching for a judicial philosophy supporting the Court's position.
The Bill of Rights is the foundation for developing government equality and
freedoms based on a natural law theory of objective fundamental rights. The
notion of applying the Equal Protection Clause as a remedy for past racial
discrimination as the Court did in Ricci also appeals to a sense of fairness
when there is empirical evidence to support the injustice of race
discrimination. Natural law principles found in the Bill of Rights protect
individuals from injustices including racial discrimination that violate
human dignity and the common good. 167 Justice Scalia, concurring in Ricci,

states: "Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection? The question is not an easy one."' 168 The
Court continues to be conscious of a potential conflict between Title VII
and its implementation by an employer that could violate the Equal
Protection Clause. This constitutional guarantee has its roots in the natural
law principal of fairness as part of our social contract and a conservative
justice would be reluctant to read into that clause a guarantee of equal
protection.
In Roscoe Pound's Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, he states that
"natural law [should] [express] the nature of government."' 169 One could
argue the nature of government is to provide equal protection of the law
including preventing employment discrimination on the basis of race and
color. Professor Pound further states that natural law principles are

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 2675 (internal quotations omitted).
See AQUINAS, supranote 14, at 995 ("A law.., regards ... the order to the common good.").
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
POUND, supra note 32, at 50.
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"protected by the Bill of Rights."170 The philosophical theory underlying
the Equal Protection clause is a natural law principle obligating an
employer to equally treat employees in a fair and equitable manner. Justice
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion stated in part:
In construing Title VII.... equal protection doctrine is of limited utility. The
Equal Protection Clause, this Court has held, prohibits only intentional
discrimination: it does not have a disparate-impact component.... Title VII, in
contrast, aims to eliminate all forms of employment discrimination,
unintentional as well as deliberate. Until today... this Court has never
questioned the constitutionality of the disparate-impact component of Title VII,
and for good reason. By instructing employers to avoid needlessly exclusionary
selection processes, Title Vii's disparate-impact provision calls for a "raceneutral means to increase minority.., participation"
something this Court's
equal protection precedents also encourage.... Observance of Title VIi's
disparate-impact provision... calls for no racial preference, absolute or
otherwise. The very purpose of the provision is to ensure that individuals are
hired and promoted based on qualifications manifestly necessary to successful
performance of the job in question. qualifications that do not screen out
members of any race. 171

Justice Ginsburg builds her argument on the legal theory that disparate-

impact

(unintentional

discrimination)

is not

inconsistent with the

constitutionality of Title VII and its very purpose calls for no racial
preference. Its purpose is to assure that "individuals are hired and promoted
based on qualifications.., necessary to successful performance of the job in
question. ' 172 The very essence of natural law would support the "no racial
preference, absolute or otherwise" holding of Justice Ginsburg's
argument.1 73 Lon Fuller would agree with Justice Ginsburg's dissent as
consistent with his position that the natural law's essential function is to
"achiev[e] a certain kind of order... through subjecting people's conduct to

the guidance of general rules by which they may themselves orient their
behavior.... 174 The dissent relies on natural law insofar as it provides rules
(i.e. Title VII) that require employers to behave in a manner that will
1 75

achieve social justice.

Legal Positivism. Contemporary scholars continue to explore legal
positivism. Professor Brian Bix of the University of Minnesota School of
Law summarizes this theory as follows: "[in simple terms, legal positivism
is built around the belief, the assumption or the dogma that the question of
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

RoscoE POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE LAW 13 (Univ. Neb. Press 1950).
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2701.
Id.
Lon L. Fuller, A Reply to Professors Cohen and Diworkin, 10 VILL. L. REv. 655, 657 (1965).
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2689 2710 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
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what is the law is separate from (and must be kept separate from) the
question of what the law should be." 176 Bix quotes Austin for further
support:
The existence of law is one thing its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be
or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed
standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though

we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate
177
our approbation and disapprobation.

When Congress enacted Title VII it recognized the social problem of
discrimination and stated the prohibition creating a legal and moral duty
based on the social phenomenon of race discrimination in the workplace. 178
Professor H.L.A. Hart in his text, The Concept of Law, argues that facts
may internalize a standard and thereby create a rule. 1 9 In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg maintains that the plaintiffs have a right to sympathy, but
not to relief under the law. 180 Justice Alito responds, seemingly adopting
the notion of legal positivism in his concurrence:
The dissent grants that petitioners' situation is "unfortunate" and that they
"understandably attract this Court's sympathy." But "sympathy" is not what

petitioners have a right to demand. What they have a right to demand is
evenhanded enforcement of the law of Title Vii's prohibition against
discrimination based on race. And that is what, until today's decision, has been
1 81
denied them.

Justice Alito's conclusion illustrates that the legal positivist notion of
unbiased enforcement of the law prohibits reverse discrimination and those
scoring highest on the test should not be discriminated against simply
because they are not in the minority.
Utilitarianism. In John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism,he argues that moral
rules are "essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of
18 2
more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life...."'
Title VII is an example of "act-utilitarianism" that concerns itself with the
net happiness for all the stakeholders for the long-term benefit and
happiness of society. It recognizes, as a teleological theory, that the
consequences of the act may not benefit all parties. Mill asserts:

176. BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE THEORY AND CONTEXT 35-36 (5th ed. 2009) (quoting JOHN AUSTN,
THE PROVTNCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMTNED 157 (1832)).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
See generally S. REP. No. 88-872 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2355.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2689 (Alito, J., concurring).
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 87 (Forgotten Books 1925) (1863).
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Act utilitarianism is contextual in nature. It is sometimes called "situational
ethics." On an act by act basis consider all the alternatives and choose the
action that will produce the most happiness for all the stakeholders in the
future. You count as one equally with others. Everyone impartially has equal
weight. It does not mean everyone will be happy with your decision. 183

In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg acknowledges that allowing the City to
84
disregard the test results would negatively impact some of the parties.
She states: "The white firefighters who scored high on New Haven's
promotional exam understandably attract this Court's sympathy. But they
had no vested right to promotion."18 5 Adopting a utilitarian approach,
Justice Ginsburg seemingly concludes the greatest good to be that which
results from disregarding the promotional exams despite the detriment to
those who scored the highest on the exam.
In adopting a utilitarian approach, Justice Ginsburg reminds us that
"[e]thics is not a matter of rigid rule keeping. It is rather a matter of being
flexible in real situations and using your reason to maximize net long-range
happiness for everyone." 18 6 In this case, to ignore the existence of disparate
impact concerns would adversely affect minority candidates in a field where
there has been a long history of discrimination in the workplace.
Legal Realism. Justice Holmes once stated that "[t]he real justification of
a rule of law, if there be one, is that it helps to bring about a social end
which we desire," a classic expression of legal realism relevant to the
philosophy supporting Title VII.187 The civil rights movement identified
employment discrimination as a social evil needing legal reform. 188 Legal
realism recognized that law is political and the social phenomenon of
employment discrimination mandated social change to enhance the
constitutional value of equal protection under law.18 9
In both Justice Alito's concurrence and Justice Ginsburg's dissent there
is mention of what role, if any, the mayor's political motivation to cater to a
segment of his constituency may have impacted the city's decision to
disregard the test results. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg observes:
As courts have recognized, 4[p]oliticians routinely respond to bad press... but it
is not a violation of Title VII to take advantage of a situation to gain political
favor.' The real issue then, is not whether the mayor and his staff were

183. Reeves, supra note 87, at 38.
184. 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185. Id.

186. Reeves, supra note 87, at 38.
187. COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 92, at 210, 238.

188. See generally 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972).
189. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at2687 88 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
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politically motivated; it is whether their attempt to score political points was
legitimate (i.e., nondiscriminatory).
Were they seeking to exclude white
firefighters from promotion... or did they realize, at least belatedly, that their
tests could be toppled in a disparate- impact suit?1 90

Justice Ginsburg's acknowledgement of the possible role of politics in
decision making with regard to enforcement of Title VII supports the legal
realist's view of using law as a means of achieving social results.
Immanuel Kant. Kant's categorical imperatives support Title VII. He
stated to "always use humanity... never merely as a means, but at the same
time as an end." 191 Kant would not agree with a workplace practice that
discriminated on the basis of race as a means to placate other workers.
Contemporary Kantian philosophers have expressed it this way:
Man's moral title to external freedom thus carries with it a correlative duty to
respect the same right in others. And since men cannot be relied upon to
observe this duty voluntarily, it must be enforced. This is the function of the
Law and the office of the State which enforces those duties all men must
observe so that each can enjoy the greatest external liberty compatible with the
like liberty of everyone else. 192
In upholding the rights of the high scoring white and Hispanic firefighters,
Justice Kennedy adopts this theory as expressed in the majority decision in
Ricci:
[The district court] ruled that respondents' "motivation to avoid making
promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact... does not, as a
matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent" under Title VII." .... And the

Government makes a similar argument in this Court. It contends that the
"structure of Title VII belies any claim that an employer's intent to comply
with Title VIi's disparate-impact provisions constitutes prohibited
discrimination on the basis of race.".... But both of those statements turn upon
the City's objective avoiding disparate-impact liability while ignoring the
City's conduct in the name of reaching that objective. Whatever the City's
ultimate aim-however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemedthe City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the
test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white. 193

In his concurrence, Justice Scalia appears to be utilizing Kant's categorical
imperative of treating individuals as ends in themselves. He states: "[T]he
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of

190. Id. at 2709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2007)).
191. JENS TIMMERMANN, KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (2007).
192. Gunnar Beck, Immanuel Kant's Theory of Rights, 19 RATIO JURIS 371, 375 (2006).

193. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671, 2673 74 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D.
Conn. 2006)).
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a racial, religious, sexual or national class." 19 4 Enforcement of the disparate
impact guidelines in this context would, in Scalia's view, amount to
unprotected reverse discrimination.
John Rawls Theory of Justice. Rawls's original position theory, in which
judgments are made behind a veil of ignorance, imagines a group of people
coming together to form a social contract unaware of their social status in
society.1 95 Rawls states: "First of all, no one knows his place in society, his
class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength and
the like."' 196 In that arrangement members in the group would not know
their race and would be in agreement with a law such as Title VII that
prohibits workplace discrimination. 197 His "equal liberty principle" that
"[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with similar liberty for others" 198 would support the value of
Title VII legislation. 99 Further, his "democratic equality principle" that
"[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are... to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged" 200 is a philosophical theory that
justifies Title VII. Justice Ginsberg states in her dissent:
The Court's recitation of the facts leaves out important parts of the story.
Firefighting is a profession in which the legacy of racial discrimination casts an

especially long shadow. In extending Title VII to state and local government
employers in 1972, Congress took note of a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
(USCCR)report finding racial discrimination in municipal employment even
"more pervasive than in the private sector." According to the report, overt
racism was partly to blame, but so too was a failure on the part of municipal
employers to apply merit-based employment principles. In making hiring and
promotion decisions, public employers often "rel[ied] on criteria unrelated to
job performance," including nepotism or political patronage. Such flawed

selection methods served to entrench preexisting racial hierarchies. The
USCCR report singled out police and fire departments for having "[b]arriers to
equal employment... greater... than in any other area of State or local
government." 2with
African-Americans "hold[ing] almost no positions in the
01
officer ranks.'

194. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
195. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
196. RAWLS,supra note 116, at 137.
197. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHATS THE RIGHT THING To Do? 153 (2009) ("Underlying

the device of the veil of ignorance is a moral argument that can be presented independent of the thought
experiment. Its main idea is that... opportunity should not be based on factors that are arbitrary from a
moral point of view.").
198. RAWLS, supranote 113, at 60.
199. Id. at61.

200. Id. at 83.
201. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690-91 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep.
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The "important parts of the story" that Justice Ginsburg recites in her
dissenting opinion are supportive of the Rawlsian Equal Liberty
Principal. 20 2 Of interest is that the development of her argument is based on
a historical and contemporary racial segregation in the public employment
sector. Her jurisprudence reflects the philosophical theory of Rawls's
Theory of Justice that "[elach person is to have an equal right to the most
20 3
extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others."
W.D. Ross's PrimaFacie Duties. Ross's duty to society would include a
duty of justice to distribute the benefits of society in a fair manner. 20 4 The
strategy behind a standardized test for firefighters seeking the positions of
lieutenants and captains is based on a fair distribution of these positions
according to competency levels rather than race preference. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, did not find in the record evidence of
the questions being unrelated to the job and held, under the "strong basis in
evidence rule" that the City did not offer sufficient evidence to rescind the
test results. 205 One could argue that the examination constituted an implied
promise to award the jobs to those who passed the exam and this created a
prima facie "duty of fidelity" because the candidates relied upon the City's
offer. Justice Ginsburg's dissent stated: "In making hiring and promotion
decisions, public employers often 'rel[Ied] on criteria unrelated to job
performance,' including nepotism or political patronage.... Such flawed
'20 6
selection methods served to entrench preexisting racial hierarchies.
Ross's position that in exceptional cases "the consequences of fulfilling a
promise... would be so disastrous to others that we judge it right not to do
so''207 would support Justice Ginsburg's dissent assuming this is an
exceptional case based on historical evidence of race discrimination. The
manner in which a judge interprets the evidence of a case will indicate a
philosophical orientation that is always fact sensitive.
IV. CONCLUSION

Jurisprudence, as the philosophy of the law, plays an important role in
understanding how a court resolves a dispute. A court's decision often reflects
a legal philosophy that is useful in understanding and contextualizing a judge's

No. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2152, and in 118 CoNG. REC. 1817).
202. Id.
203. RAWLS, supra note 113, at 60.
204. Ross, supra note 127, at 26-27.
205. 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
206. Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
207. Ross, supra note 127, at 18.
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decision-making methods. By analyzing a decision from a legal philosophical
perspective, one better understands the judge's judicial philosophy, which is
more useful than a superficial classification of "liberal" or "conservative"
orientation. Constitutional values can be defended from the perspective of
many legal philosophical theories, and judges and legislatures often utilize
different philosophies for different purposes. It is important to recognize that a
judge's decision will often adopt various legal philosophical theories, and
conservative and liberal judges may follow principles established by different
philosophers and judicial theorists. Recognizing a legal philosophical theory
reflected in a judicial opinion provides an insightful perspective that exceeds
the bare judicial argument stated in the decision. Comprehending the legal
philosophy in a judge's decision provides a clearer understanding of the
opinion and renders a more meaningful debate of the issues.
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